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Foreword
Technological advancement has brought about incalculable benefits for us, both as individuals 
and for society as a whole, making our lives easier, healthier, happier and more productive.
But the very technologies that help enhance modern life can also create fresh challenges 
as a result of the ways we choose to use them. Our views of what uses are and aren’t 
acceptable change over time.
So it is with the technology developed to assist with road traffic law enforcement. By using 
equipment such as breathalysers and ‘drugalysers’, police officers are able swiftly and 
indisputably to establish whether a driver has strayed beyond the permissible legal limits.
But how do we feel about technology that works independently? Speed cameras in their 
many guises immediately spring to mind: often requested by householders worried for the 
safety of their streets – but often viewed with suspicion by drivers who see the revenue from 
fixed penalty notices racking up.
We wanted to take a close look at the implications of automation in the area of traffic 
enforcement becoming yet more widespread. With police force budgets under huge 
pressure, there must be a temptation to see automation not merely as a way of augmenting 
capability but as a substitute for it – one which releases officers to pursue other duties.
So, as a first step, we commissioned Dr Adam Snow, a criminologist who is expert in the 
fields of road traffic, road safety and parking enforcement, to write this report exploring the 
deployment of automation to date, the legal framework that governs its operation, and the 
scope for police and highway authorities to go further.
There are some clear messages:
• the legal framework exists to accommodate far greater use of automatic 
technology to enforce traffic offences than is presently the case;
• as camera accuracy has improved, the costs of such technology have continued 
to tumble;
• the systems that manage big data can link driver licence, vehicle keeper, insurance 
and MOT records in the blink of an eye.
This all begs a bigger question: is the present brake on further deployment of automated 
enforcement less about cost, and more about the public acceptability of these systems? 
We’ll be exploring that question in a future report.
Steve Gooding
Director, RAC Foundation
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Between 2010 and 2014, full-time-equivalent 
officers in road traffic policing 
decreased by 23%
In 1960, there were 16,921 fixed penalty 
notices (FPNs) issued, for two offences.
In 1991, there were 5.65 million FPNs 
issued, for 37 offences.
4.71 million private parking penalties, 
a three-fold increase since 2012. 
In 2011, 52% of FPNs were 
camera-detected. In 2015 it was 74%. 
In 2011, there were 9.85 million On The Spot Penalties (OTSP) issued, 
for 79 police-enforced moving traffic offences and 15 local authority-enforced 
traffic offences*.
*  The penalty regime has changed over time, which limits the comparative assessment for penalty notice figures. See section 
2.5 for an explanation of reforms to the penalty structure since 1991.
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Executive Summary
Road traffic enforcement has two essential aims: public safety and the efficient management 
of the road network (which includes the parking of vehicles on the road network). 
Enforcement aimed at promoting these twin aims is certainly viewed as problematic, from 
the perspective of both enforcement officers and the public.
For the public, the linking of money (as penalties and fines) with enforcement creates 
the potential for a breakdown of trust, particularly where the traffic management aim is 
concerned (although even the public safety remit is not free from concern in this regard). 
It is the essential similarity of the punishment – in terms of process (typically the on-the-
spot penalty) and the actual amount of the penalty – between offences relating to traffic 
management and those concerning road safety that creates this potential for public 
concern. When activities which differ widely in the level of risk they entail and/or potential 
of harm they can cause are punished in the same fashion (and frequently using the 
same methods of automated enforcement), this to a certain extent offends our sense of 
proportionality and of substantive justice1.
As regards the problems for enforcement professionals, automation seems to promise 
much in the way of addressing the age-old challenge of effectiveness (as measured by 
cost, compliance and deterrence). Officers no longer need be physically present to enforce 
road traffic laws, thus reducing cost. Furthermore, far more offenders can be caught, 
and processed, through automated means, leading to greater compliance and increased 
deterrence. However, these same professionals also need to maintain a sufficient level 
of public support (and legitimacy) to operate effectively and ensure compliance (that is, 
compliance as a matter of course/habit rather than through fear/deterrence alone) with 
road traffic regulations. This report seeks to explore this difficult balance by highlighting the 
development of automation in road traffic enforcement, and seeks to explore where we 
might be going with such enforcement.
Research into the use of automated enforcement of road traffic regulations is at a nascent 
stage. A number of scholars across the social sciences and in the legal field are beginning 
to grapple with the increased challenges that it poses. The primary challenge for such 
enforcement has related to how increasing automation has impacted upon conceptions of 
fairness for motorists and other road users. This report is a preliminary investigation into the 
extent to which we have come to rely on automated enforcement in the road traffic/safety 
context, and how possible future reliance on the technology might develop. Although this 
report does not examine the issue of fairness directly, it undoubtedly forms an important 
background context for the public acceptance of automated enforcement. What a fair and 
just enforcement system looks like depends upon many factors involving both procedural 
elements of justice (how people are treated within the system) and substantive elements 
(the fairness of outcomes from the system). The discussion below teases out some potential 
1  Substantive justice here relates to the extent to which people judge the fairness of the outcome of the process (i.e. whether 
they were fined of not) rather than the intrinsic fairness of the process itself (the way they are treated throughout the process)
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problems relating to perceptions of fairness within the system, but does not address them 
directly. At present, we have some indications of what the ‘fairness’ issues seem to be, but 
further study is needed to develop our understanding of what they actually are, and crucially, 
how they can be addressed within an automated enforcement regime.
This research maps how automation has played a key role in the development of modern 
road traffic and road safety enforcement. The research shows that there has been increasing 
automation of punishment, with the development of an out-of-court penalty system and an 
increasing reliance on automated technology to capture instances of offending – so much 
so that approximately 11.5 million out-of-court penalties are issued each year in respect of 
problematic motoring, and a significant proportion of these penalties are captured through 
camera technology. As the report highlights, certain offences – such as speeding – rely 
heavily on the use of automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems: over 70% of all 
police fixed penalty notices issued in 2015 involved an offence captured by camera (and for 
speeding offences that figure is over 90%). The austerity agenda has increased this reliance 
on automation, with the reduction (and in some police forces the complete removal) of 
dedicated road traffic police officers. Local authority (LA) enforcement, on the other hand, 
has seen, as a consequence of deliberate government policy, a reduction in the reliance 
on automated means of enforcement. To a certain extent this may be a justified response 
to the perceived lack of genuine concern for public safety in a majority of LA road traffic 
enforcement (particularly off-street parking). However, LAs do exercise enforcement powers 
in relation to road safety (even simple parking can be a road safety concern when a vehicle 
is left in a dangerous position), and the near-blanket ban on ANPR camera enforcement in 
such circumstances is not logically defensible.
Public opinion has, from the outset, played an important part in the debate about the extent 
to which enforcement should rely on automation. There may be sound technological and 
safety reasons for increasing reliance on automation, but without the support of the public, 
the system is likely to engender feelings of distrust and illegitimacy. We can see, from LA 
regulation of parking and from traffic regulation, that fears of improper and illegitimate use 
of technology (and powers) can lead to widespread delegitimisation of important public 
policy. Indeed, it may not even be LA enforcement that leads to such feelings; instead, 
the operation of companies in enforcement of parking on private land may be leading to a 
cross-contamination of illegitimacy and distrust between public and private operators. This 
also has the potential to affect police road traffic enforcement, where similar methods (i.e. 
ANPR) are used to capture wrongdoing, particularly where instances of alleged wrongdoing 
are decontextualised and stripped of all the surrounding circumstances in favour of a simple, 
single picture (or series of pictures) originating from a camera.
It seems reasonably clear, at present, that the level of public support is difficult to gauge. 
Certainly, in the abstract, there is public support for automated road traffic enforcement 
where there are safety concerns. However, such support can dissipate quite quickly when 
drivers’ experiences differ significantly from the expectations of perfection that they have of 
automated methods of enforcement. The motoring public may be in favour of road safety 
enforcement to the extent that each instance of wrongdoing represents an actual instance 
of harm; when, however, the instance represents merely an increased risk of harm in the 
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abstract (which is the case with fixed camera speeding enforcement), then support starts to 
reduce. The challenge for authorities is to understand the views of the motoring public in this 
complex area of regulation, and to then decide (or at least examine the issue of) what form 
legitimate enforcement should (or could) take in the field of road safety.
As regards road traffic regulation and public support, as stated above, there is not enough 
reliable data available at present to shed light on the public’s opinion on automated 
enforcement. Anecdotal evidence exists which suggests that the public are wary of the 
use of automated enforcement in LAs, and of the reasons for its use. It is very doubtful, 
in particular, that there is much public support for extending ANPR enforcement to LA car 
parks. Given the hostile media and the poor practices – questionably managed incentive 
schemes and targets, for example – of some LAs (or commissioned providers), and 
not forgetting the impact of the actions of the private sector in the realm of parking on 
private land, there is a long way to go before the generalised sense of distrust of parking 
enforcement is successfully countered.
That being said, the camera opens the possibility for far more effective management of 
the road network than that possible by human means alone. It holds out the potential for 
cheaper and more effective control of the flows of traffic in those areas (the pinch points) 
in our towns and cities where intelligent traffic systems can plan and direct the great 
(and ever-increasing) weight of traffic. Exactly where the human element (drivers, traffic 
managers, police officers, civilian enforcement officers (CEOs), pedestrians, etc.) fits into 
this management of an essentially chaotic system is a matter for public debate. With the 
increasing automation of all things related to road traffic (not just enforcement), we are at risk 
of losing the human element of transport. There are both negatives and positives in such 
an approach; in terms of enforcement, the positive is the removal of traditional notions of 
bias. Cameras care not for colour, religion, race, gender, and so on. However, the camera 
cannot provide discretion (and common sense, one dare say) or show the same level of care 
and concern that a human officer can. What the public want –and what the enforcement 
authorities can offer, in this regard – requires further study and public debate. At present, as 
Chapter 3 demonstrates, the human, in enforcement authorities, is becoming an increasing 
rarity. With austerity, and associated tight controls on police budgets, dedicated road traffic 
police officers are becoming something of a rarity.
Even where the human is still present in the enforcement authority, technological automation 
is becoming increasingly embedded as part of policing practice (in its widest sense). Officers 
increasingly rely on technological gadgets that constrain their discretion and remove difficult 
issues of proof of offending from interactions with citizens. The mobile phone, handheld 
computer, breathalyser kit and the like can provide him or her with a handy – and easy – 
technological solution to the tricky problem of proving an offence. Of course, simply by using 
such a device, the officer’s discretion to ignore such offending (for potentially perfectly valid and 
just reasons – with the possible exception of drink-driving) or deal with it by way of a warning 
is lessening. This reduction in officer discretion (whether police or CEO) is typically perceived 
as the officer lacking common sense (see Snow, 2015) and can potentially lead to further 
delegitimisation of the both the law and the organisation enforcing it. Again, understanding public 
concerns, and how authorities can address these concerns, merits further study.
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The focus on enforcement, throughout this report, should not be taken to mean that 
automation is always about punishing recalcitrant motorists. Automation can also facilitate 
compliance with road safety and traffic management objectives, whether that be through 
smart mobile technology that links with other road users to provide real-time (big) data 
solutions to traffic (and safety) problems, or by means of more simple devices which 
limit speed or prevent driving in certain circumstances. In this report, concerned as it is 
with automated enforcement, the prevention of driving through automated means is also 
examined, as authorities have been actively looking at technological solutions which prevent 
recidivist driving offenders from causing further danger. The so-called ignition interlock 
systems permit or prevent a vehicle from starting depending on a range of factors, such as 
blood alcohol content for recidivist drunk drivers, seat belt engagement and mobile phone 
use. This report finds limited support for these systems in England and Wales, and that they 
are unlikely to be adopted in the very near future, although the European Commission, in 
combination with the European Transport Safety Council, has, on the basis of on a number 
of trials, been strongly promoting alcohol interlocks (in combination with motorist re-
education courses) as a solution to the drink-drive problem.
Whilst this report examines the current and potential future use of automated enforcement, 
it is worth noting, as Dodge and Kitchin (2007) do, that the process of automation (at 
least as regards the physical processes) is not spatially uniform. The deployment of ‘smart 
motorways’, with the cost and inconvenience of their installation, is not a uniform response 
of government, but is a partial one with stretches of road still subject to traditional methods 
of management and control. Furthermore, the non-motorway network, although increasingly 
adopting automated means of management, is not at the same stage of monitoring and 
development. Dodge and Kitchin call these locations ‘unwired places’ (2007: 273): they 
are spaces where the regulation of the road is largely free of automated monitoring for 
enforcement purposes. This spatial differentiation can be seen in the wide variation in 
the uptake, and use, of automated methods of enforcement, as examined in Chapter 3. 
Automated enforcement is partial, and at certain locations extensive; this report has sought 
to map its current and potential future use.
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1. Introduction
The enforcement of road traffic offending can be broadly split, according to the 
underlying rationales, into two distinct types: enforcement aimed at ensuring 
road safety, and enforcement aimed at regulating the use of roads (and car 
parks). This is a coarse distinction, and some cases straddle both categories. 
For example, parking one’s car on a public road can be both an inconvenience 
to other users and, at times, a clear danger to both other road users and 
pedestrians. In relation to road safety traffic enforcement, offences that are 
regulated according to risk mean that drivers who cause no actual harm but 
are deemed to constitute a ‘risk of harm’ are penalised. It is worth bearing 
this distinction in mind when reading this report, as it is fair to say that support 
for automation in road traffic enforcement is likely to be consequential upon 
the underlying justifications for the road traffic regulation in question. As will 
be discussed later in this report, support for automated camera enforcement 
is stronger when it comes to road safety-related enforcement (presumably 
because of the underlying risk to life / danger of personal injury) than it is in 
relation to road traffic regulation.
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In 2014/15 (the latest year for which statistics are available at the time of writing), there were 
11,955,2182 financial out-of-court disposals (in which the crime or offence is dealt with 
without requiring a prosecution in court) for traffic-related offending. This figure consists of 
all Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) issued by local authorities (LAs) (10,293,484), all fixed 
penalty notices (FPNs) issued by the police (1,016,827), late licensing penalties (LLPs) 
and out-of-court settlements3 issued by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) 
(480,790 LLPs, and 161,117 out-of-court settlements), and heavy goods vehicle (HGV) 
levy offence FPNs issued by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) (3,000). The 
notices listed above are all issued by (or on behalf of) governmental bodies (LAs, the police 
or other quasi-governmental bodies).
Private institutions have also used similar penalties, primarily to control parking on private 
land, albeit neither for road safety nor for road traffic regulation purposes. These private 
providers are under no obligation to collect and publish statistics on the number of such 
penalties issued (other than for the benefit of their shareholders). However, in recent years 
there is evidence that this number has begun to increase. The RAC Foundation recently 
estimated that 4.71 million private penalties had been issued, which represents a threefold 
increase since 2012.4 There has been increasing anecdotal evidence that backlashes 
against automated enforcement may be, in part, due to the increasing use of such methods 
in private parking enforcement.
This report focuses generally on the use, and potential increased use, of automated 
enforcement for purposes related to public law. It would, however, be remiss to ignore 
the private parking issue, so throughout the report, where appropriate, the situation of the 
private sector will be examined to determine its effect on public law enforcement.5
Nearly 12 million notices were issued in 2014/15 – this represents a serious amount of 
regulatory ‘offending’, and it requires a significant investment in enforcement to capture 
and process this number of offenders. To put it into context, the total number of sentences 
handed out by the criminal courts in the year ending March 2015 amounted to a tenth of 
this number, 1.2 million, covering offences from murder to TV licence evasion. The Health 
and Safety Executive, which also conducts public safety enforcement in the workplace, 
issued 11,403 notices and prosecuted 696 cases. It is worth bearing in mind that this is in a 
context in which there are more injuries and illnesses related to work than there are injured 
on the roads (although the number of people killed on the road, at 1,730 (Lloyd et al., 2016), 
far exceeds the number of deaths at work, which total 144 (HSE, 2016)).
In recent years, enforcement agencies have been turning to automation to assist in the 
management, capture and processing of road traffic offending. This report examines the use 
2  Unfortunately, the reporting periods for the out-of-court disposals offered do not always overlap. The reporting period 
for police-issued FPNs is April–March, as it is for PCNs for local authorities; LLPs issued by the DVSA are reported for the 
calendar year, whereas HGV levy offence penalties run from June 2014 – June 2015. Out-of-court settlements issued by the 
DVLA run from October 2014 to June 2015.
3  These are fixed penalties set at £30 plus 1.5 × the outstanding vehicle tax rate.
4  The statistics are based on requests to the DVLA from private parking companies for driver information, which it is 
presumed were used for parking charge notices (RAC Foundation, 2017). 
5  Of course, private companies are increasingly being relied upon to enforce local authority parking. Throughout this report, 
unless specifically mentioned, local authority parking enforcement relates to both in-house enforcement and tendered private 
company enforcement of local authority regulations. The appeals and enforcement structure is identical (through the Traffic 
Penalty Tribunal and the civil courts): all that differentiates the two is who is doing the actual enforcement – although, of 
course, the profit motive of private firms conducting such activity makes the relationship interesting and complex.
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of automation in such enforcement. It is a preliminary examination of the current extent and 
likely future rollout of automation in road traffic regulation/control. The report starts with a brief 
history of automation of punishment to elicit possible explanations for the use (and expansion 
in use) of automated means of enforcement. Following this, the current extent of automated 
camera enforcement will be discussed, and an examination made of regional variations, 
which can also give indications as to the likely future direction in which automation is going. In 
the final section, the potential future of automated enforcement will discussed; drawing on the 
previous two sections, and government policy, it will suggest the likely short-term and long-
term development of automation in the field of road traffic enforcement.
The use of automated enforcement generally conjures up images of the archetypal yellow 
Gatso speed cameras. However, with the increasing development of technology, automated 
enforcement now covers a much broader range of motoring offending/transgression. Speed 
cameras still account for a sizeable proportion of automated road traffic enforcement; 
however, other methods are now increasing, including red-light enforcement and the use 
of car dash-mounted automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems. Furthermore, 
LAs are increasingly looking to technology such as bus lane cameras and ANPR parking 
systems to provide cost-effective solutions to their road traffic regulation responsibilities. 
Finally, the use of automated enforcement has also become somewhat democratised, 
with the spread of dash- and helmet-mounted action cameras (and the sharing of footage 
on social networks), leading to ever-greater potential for automated (and crowd-sourced) 
enforcement.6 The proliferation of technological solutions for road traffic regulation (in terms 
of enforcement and enforcement processing) has the potential to produce a vast increase in 
the number of enforcement captures, but at the moment we do not know at what cost.
ANPR has been instrumental in the growth of traffic regulation. From its first use in the 
1980s in the Dartford Tunnel (Hansard: House of Commons, 1983) as an intelligence 
gathering tool, it has grown through the National Safety Camera Partnership (NSCP) (Wells, 
2012), and beyond, to become the primary means by which speeding and traffic light 
offences are enforced.
Although the acronym ‘ANPR’ suggests a uniformity of use, there are many different ANPR 
systems in use by the police, LAs and private enforcement bodies. The ANPR cameras 
read vehicle number plates using optical character recognition software, and record 
the date, time and location of these reads, instantaneously cross-matching the number 
plates with information held on various databases (Haines & Wells, 2012). In police road 
traffic enforcement, the ANPR camera will link with both the DVLA and the Police National 
Computer to provide intelligence and enforcement opportunities. LA and private parking 
enforcement use of ANPR, although constrained by legislation, typically searches and 
retrieves data from the DVLA’s vehicles database, in order to process the enforcement 
ticket. This form of automation is, in terms of the number of penalty notices issued, the most 
common form of sanctioning for road policing. As will be discussed below, enforcement by 
ANPR outstrips the traditional method of issuing a notice by the roadside quite significantly, 
and is the typical means through which a driver will be sanctioned.
6  The private sector has also sought to exploit the power of crowd-sourcing enforcement through incentives to capture 
parked cars on private land, by offering £10 payments (Pitt, 2017).
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Thus far the reader might be forgiven for thinking that automation is solely a matter of 
advanced technology. However, the development of the punishment system for the minor 
end of road traffic regulatory offending (and other parts of the criminal justice system too, 
according to a recent MOJ consultation (MOJ, 2016)) has been subject to increasing 
automation in terms of the way in which punishment is administered and imposed. As the 
Chapter 2 demonstrates, the development of the FPN, and the administrative processes 
surrounding it, arose from a series of steps within the justice system that have focused on 
routinising and automating punishment.
It should be noted, at the outset, that a coherent assessment of road traffic enforcement 
(including its automation) is difficult owing to a number of factors. The split between LA and 
police enforcement is perhaps relatively settled, although increasingly local councils are 
taking over functions regarding moving traffic that would traditionally have been the exclusive 
purview of the police (e.g. waiting in a box junction). As will be discussed below, such 
changes to the respective functions of the police and LAs have much to do with increasing 
the effectiveness (by reducing the administrative burden) on police forces and the criminal 
justice system. Thus, the idea that LA enforcement is ‘parking’ enforcement and that the 
police enforce ‘moving traffic’ is an antiquated idea. Increasingly, LAs are taking over these 
functions (in addition to which other governmental bodies, such as DVSA and DVLA, are 
taking on forms of traffic enforcement), but the question remains whether the training and 
attitudes of police officers are being transferred along with the responsibilities.
Furthermore, the split (in law) between the Greater London Authorities and the rest of 
England and Wales complicates the legal picture, with different legislation applying at 
different times throughout the history of LA ‘parking’ enforcement (for example, the 
decriminalisation7 of parking enforcement in 1991 for Greater London Authorities, and in 
2004 for the rest of England and Wales8). Even allowing for this split, the local nature of LAs 
also complicates the picture further, with neighbouring authorities adopting decriminalisation 
powers and automation at different times. It should therefore be borne in mind when 
discussing road traffic enforcement that it is, by and large, a ‘local’ issue. Certainly, there will 
be commonalities of approach – the desire to increase effectiveness, to streamline and to 
obtain value for money may lead to a certain level of uniformity – but it remains the case that 
enforcement decisions are essentially local decisions – that is, of course, unless there is a 
clear national policy, as with the removal of ANPR enforcement for all but a few offences in 
the LA enforcement sector.
Taking the above into consideration this report therefore seeks to examine both the 
commonalities and the particularities in the automated enforcement of road traffic regulation 
that impact on where we are going with automated enforcement.
7  ‘Decriminalisation’ refers, in the road traffic and parking context, to the powers contained within the Traffic Management Act 
2004. The Act removed parking offences from the criminal law for authorities that adopted its provisions, setting up in its place 
a civil appellate system and, in the event of ultimate non-payment, providing for recovery through the civil (county) courts.
8  Authorities outside London could, nevertheless, operate decriminalised parking enforcement under the Road Traffic Act 
1991 if they adopted the provisions of the Act through a Permitted Parking and Special Parking Area Order. The first authorities 
to do so were Winchester, Oxfordshire, Maidstone, Buckinghamshire and Watford (NPAS, 2000).
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Automation
Before examining the historical, contemporary and future development of automated 
enforcement, it is important to distinguish between the types of automation that are 
discussed in this report. There are number of ways in which the concept of automated 
enforcement can be understood. Perhaps the most in-depth theoretical treatment of 
automated enforcement (and perhaps the most automated version) in the realm of road 
traffic is O’Malley’s idea of simulated justice and telemetric policing (O’Malley, 2010). 
O’Malley paints the picture thus (ibid.: 765):
“In many jurisdictions, I may be fined for speeding, or illegally parking, or being on a 
freeway without a pass, or running a red light – by nobody. The infringement may be 
registered by a police officer, but even that is becoming less common. Increasingly, 
infringements are registered electronically either from a bar code implanted in 
my vehicle or from a digital photograph of the vehicle registration number… I am 
policed, judged and sanctioned but no one has seen me, nor have I been ‘sensed’ 
in any human way. In key respects, I have not been there: my electronic trace 
has been there and that is what registers for the purposes of governance. This is 
simulated justice…”
This ‘perfect’ system of automation, at present, exists only potentially for a select number 
of offences – typically speeding, running a red light, and the decriminalised moving traffic 
offences of driving in a bus lane and waiting in a box junction. Here a camera takes a picture 
of the vehicle and, using its on-board ANPR system, matches that vehicle against the DVLA 
register of vehicle owners. Certain systems can then auto-generate the case file and  
letter / conditional offer of a fixed penalty, which only needs signing on behalf of the relevant 
LA / police officer. This is what O’Malley means by “simulated justice” – indeed, but for the 
demerit points on the licence, the whole process is stripped of any individual interactions 
(should the recipient choose to pay instantly). In such a system the penalty resembles, as 
O’Malley has noted elsewhere, “just another bill, not an occasion for moralized commentary” 
(O’Malley, 2009: 108).
Automation, in the sense of “the technique of making an apparatus, a process, or a system 
operate automatically” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, undated), can also be seen in the wider 
process through which road traffic law has developed, specifically the withdrawal of the 
courts and court processes, for a great range of motoring offences. The law now operates 
in a system that is highly routinised and, following a transgression, operates virtually 
automatically until such time as a penalty is paid (not necessarily by the transgressor).9
A further form of automation in the road traffic context is the development of systems which 
rely on technology to remove the discretionary human element from enforcement. This 
form of automation relies on a synthesis of technology and human input to capture and 
9  The system is, of course, not unconcerned about so-called ‘point-swaps’ cases, where drivers attempt to avoid penalty 
points by nominating another person as the driver at the time of the offence. Although the justice system might not care who 
pays the fine (family, friends, employers or whoever), it will certainly care about on whose licence the penalty points go.
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process those who breach motoring regulations. Typical instances of this style of automated 
enforcement are the use of breathalysers by the police to prove a case of drink-driving, 
and handheld devices used by civilian enforcement officers (CEOs) that help keep track of 
parking transgressions and ensure that the evidence is robust and independent. In effect, 
the technology combines with human input to reduce human (discretionary) judgement in 
favour of a more independent and objective evidential approach.
A final understanding of automation in road traffic regulation relates to methods for 
preventing breaches of regulation before they are committed. In this final category, speed 
limiters and ignition devices which prevent a car from operating in certain conditions 
are two examples that have the capacity to ensure that road traffic law is complied with 
automatically. In the parking sector, methods for preventing a breach of requirements may 
also be developed that facilitate compliance rather than simply making automation a tool to 
make enforcement more effective/efficient.10
Thus, there are four types of automated enforcement that are discussed in this research:
1. streamlined enforcement procedures;
2. technologically facilitated enforcement;
3. full automation; and
4. enforcement using automation as a facilitative device.
In the next section, which examines the history of automating motoring enforcement, the 
wider understanding of automated enforcement is analysed, specifically the streamlining of 
enforcement processes such that upon a transgression being witnessed (by human or by 
technology), the process inevitably leads to punishment being imposed.
10  It is fair to say that, at present, automated technological developments seem to be almost exclusively focused on making 
enforcement more efficient rather than on preventative measures, although one could argue that parking apps that issue text 
reminders of overstay may be an example of automation facilitating compliance rather than assisting punishment.
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2. A History of Automated 
Motoring Punishment – 
Streamlining Enforcement 
Procedures
The first speed limits were introduced in 1865 under the Locomotive Act. 
The Act set speed limits on road-going ‘locomotives’ of 4 mph in the open 
countryside and 2 mph in towns (Plowden, 1971). At the same time a concern 
was growing, particularly in the metropolis, about the danger to pedestrians 
from carriage drivers operating in a “wanton and furious” manner (Hansard: 
House of Lords, 1860). This opened a debate, that continues to this day, 
between prescriptive regulations which target behaviour, regardless of the risk 
of harm (e.g. speeding11) and those that target behaviour where the risk of 
harm is manifest (e.g. dangerous driving).
11  This is not to deny, of course, the fact that evidence demonstrating that speeding is a general risk clearly 
exists (see Allsop, 2010; Tay, 2010; Wilson et al., 2010; amongst many others).
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The law on speeding represents an operationalisation of the concept of safety, rather than 
an actual specific concern with safe driving. With speeding offences, as Wells states, 
speed limits “represent the demarcation of ‘safe’ (and legal) from ‘dangerous’ (and illegal) 
behaviour” (Wells, 2012: 23). This demarcation takes place regardless of the actual level 
of risk of harm posed by the individual speeding motorist.12 This automatisation of the law, 
whereby the speed limit acts as a proxy for ‘safe’ or ‘non-harmful’ driving regardless of the 
actual level of harm caused (or the potential for it), lends itself nicely to a technological (and 
automated) procedure for capture and enforcement.
The debate over the risk of harm versus the actual harm caused reached its zenith in 
1930, with the motoring lobby convincing Parliament that speed limits, in themselves, were 
dangerous. Accordingly, Parliament passed the Road Traffic Act 1930 which abolished all 
speed limits in favour of a focus on the standard of driving (Corbett, 2003). It was felt by 
Parliament, at the time, that speed limits contributed to crashes and that it was safer to 
allow drivers to set responsible limits for the conditions themselves (Emsley, 1993). The 
victory for the motoring lobby was short-lived, however, and speed limits were reintroduced 
in 1934 under the Transport Act 1934 (Corbett, 2003). The debate still continues (recent 
examples include the ‘Twenty’s Plenty’ debate and the discussion of the motorway 
speed limit), with the Association of British Drivers recently stating “the widespread use of 
enforcement technology has led to large numbers of prosecutions of essentially safe drivers” 
(cited in TSC, 2016: 12). Furthermore it argues “that the increasing use of technology in 
lieu of roads police has led to speeding offences being given ‘greater importance than they 
deserve’ due to being relatively easy to measure” (ibid.). However it seems unlikely that 
there will be significant change in this regard in the near future, primarily because there is a 
great deal of scientific consensus on the positive contribution that speed limits make to road 
safety (see Box & Bayliss, 2012; Cameron & Elvik, 2010; Elvik, Christensen and Amundsen, 
et al., 2004; Pilkington & Kinra, 2005; WHO, 2013).
The motor car and driver
As Wells sets out, during the growth of modern car ownership “an increasing number of 
authors… were beginning to write not just about the car as a technological development 
but about its social, political and criminological significance” (2012: 26). The motor vehicle’s 
significance lay not just in the rapid growth of ownership, but the impact which that had on 
law enforcement.
Motoring crime, set in its social context, became something less than a crime, but not so 
minor that nothing needed to be done about it. On the one hand, as Emsley states, there 
was the ‘whiggish view of law making… that the motor vehicle presented a problem in need 
of solution’ (1993: 358). On the other hand, the punishment process that developed for 
minor motoring crime can be seen as a compromise between the problem of increased car 
ownership and the difficulty of criminalising increasing numbers of ‘normal’ people (Emsley, 
12  It is, however, worth noting that speed limits are increasingly being set with reference to pedestrian safety – research 
demonstrates a clear link between speed limits and severity of pedestrian injury (WHO, 2013), and indicates a pressing need 
for road safety intervention.
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1993). The normalisation of ownership of motor vehicles, the spread of this ownership 
across class boundaries, and the fact that “the driving public has become an electoral force 
to be reckoned with” (Corbett, 2003: 33) together led to inevitable trade-offs between the 
view of the law as combating crime and its perception as combating the motoring public.
One key interest group in this development was the social elite, and its role in developing 
motoring offences (particularly speeding and its enforcement) is of interest. O’Malley argues, 
like Emsley, that the impact on the court (and justice system) of the rise of the motor vehicle 
in the early twentieth century put little extra pressure on the courts (2009: 99). Instead, 
the involvement of the socially elite motor-vehicle-owning class in legislative drafting, and 
lobbying, meant that “speeding fines were already being administratively bureaucratized: 
distanced from denunciation in court and regarded as applicable to offences that were only 
debatably ‘criminal’” (ibid.: 100).
Through a series of Home Office circulars, the police and Home Office had already 
championed the use of pleas by post, where the driver of the vehicle did not have to 
appear in court. As O’Malley states, these procedures “eroded the moral and denunciatory 
ceremonial of court and introduced a more bureaucratic form of justice” (ibid.: 99). Motoring 
crime was not real crime at all, but an administrative matter – one that could be dealt with on 
paper rather than requiring the offender’s presence. There was a sense in which courts, and 
the justice system, were operating as if motoring crime could be resolved by a gentlemen’s 
agreement.
Another possible driver for the bureaucratisation (and automatisation) of the process, and 
consequently the lack of denunciatory court pronouncements is, as Plowden states, that 
police officers “dislike[d] enforcing road safety partly because of their discomfort at having 
to deal with an offender who so often will not ‘come quietly’” (1971: 393). Emsley points out 
that one way round this particular legal/sociological phenomenon was to label those who 
did not conform to motoring laws as ‘road hogs’, which “by identifying scapegoats, adds 
legitimacy to the law by its implication that the law is designed to deal with outsiders who 
threaten society” (1993: 380). However at the same time, Emsley argues, “there could be 
no simple response to the problem since a whole series of interest groups were involved” 
(ibid.: 381).
Automatisation had already been a factor in enforcing speed limits prior to the 1930 
Transport Act, and indeed the first instance of a technological device – the humble watch 
– had been allowed into evidence to prove a case of speeding in 1906 (Fisher, 1957). 
The constable merely measured a set distance and then timed the motorist over that 
distance; this was then allowed into evidence through the policeman’s statement. The use 
of innovative approaches to speed-trap enforcement had been tried across a Western 
world struggling to keep up with the problems created by the motor car. In 1903, in the 
State of New York, USA, three police officers disguised as tree trunks and equipped with a 
stopwatch and telephone operated one of the first recognised speed traps. Fisher explains 
(Fisher, 1957: 263):
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“As a speeding car passed the first station the policeman telephoned the time to 
the officer in the next tree, who set his stop watch accordingly and computed the 
speed. If it was above the limit he phoned the officer in the third tree who lowered a 
pole across the road. When the boom was lowered on him the driver stopped and 
was warned about his speed.”
The victory for speed limit campaigners in the Transport Act 1934 resulted in the law taking 
a decisive (and now seemingly irrevocable) step into the automatisation of enforcing societal 
laws. No longer did the police have to prove that the driving of the motorist fell below 
accepted standards of carelessness: instead, an offence could automatically be proved if an 
imposed limit was exceeded. This took away the subjective element of the law in favour of 
an automatic application of the law based on objective scientific calculations (the speed of 
an object, as determined by measuring the time taken to travel a set distance).
Throughout the following century, this process of incremental change in police procedures 
increased the automation of punishment for road traffic offending. The changes documented 
below arose generally as a result of complaints from police forces about the regulatory 
burden of dealing with drivers’ intransigence in accepting the punishment.
Changing procedures to deal with problematic motoring
The absence of a defendant at trial for motoring offences first gained official recognition in a 
1923 Home Office circular – the motorist was merely convicted in their absence. A further 
1954 circular advised magistrates that defendants no longer had to attend court to formally 
plead guilty, thus further automating punishment where the driver need not even attend to 
accept their fine. The next automation of punishment for motoring offending came in 1960, 
with the creation of an out-of-court disposal, the on-the-spot penalty (OTSP), which ensured 
that the driver did not have to attend court at all (or even be convicted).
Just two offences were included in the first round of FPNs under the Road Traffic and Road 
Improvements Act 1960, namely inadequate lighting at night and non-payment of a parking 
meter charge. It is interesting to note that since the outset of the fixed penalty regime, both 
road safety and parking regulation have attracted a similar punishment (an on-the-spot 
fine). There are certainly substantive fairness issues that can be raised about the imposition 
of a similar penalty for seemingly differing levels of culpability (for instance overstaying on 
parking meter is clearly less of a danger / less serious than safely illuminating one’s vehicle). 
However, culpability and/or underlying rationales were not the main factors underlying the 
fact that these two offences were dealt with via an OTSP. Rather, the penalties for these two 
specific offences were introduced on the basis of a perceived inability of the courts to deal 
with them, and to relieve the police from the burden of prosecuting such cases (Hansard: 
House of Commons, 1960). Of course, in introducing the OTSPs, the government was also 
keen to ensure that the punishment imposed was not too onerous or unjust (or at least 
not so unjust as to lead to mass non-payment – a goal which proved hard to attain, as 
discussed below.).
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The initial introduction of FPNs in 1960 resulted in a 37% decrease in ‘inadequate lighting’ 
offences prosecuted at the magistrates’ court, but at the same time resulted in a 50% 
net increase in prosecutions at the magistrates court for parking meter offences. Overall 
however, in the first full year of the policy, there was a 29% total reduction in the number 
of prosecutions for these two offences, suggesting some success in reducing the burden 
on magistrates’ courts. Over the next ten years the number of prosecutions fluctuated (see 
Figure 2.1). In the case of lighting offences there was a general downward trend (perhaps 
as lighting technology on cars became more reliable), whereas parking meter offences 
increased quite significantly (possibly due to the widespread expansion of the technology, 
combined with the motoring public’s distaste for them).
Overall there was an increase in the number of these (parking meter) cases prosecuted at 
the magistrates’ court during the 1960s, somewhat undermining the efficiency claims made 
for the system.
Figure 2.1: Court prosecutions, in England and Wales, for fixed penalty notice (FPN) 



















Lighting offences Parking meter offences Combined
Source: Data extrapolated from “Offences Relating to Motor Vehicles” HMSO, years 1961-1971
From just 16,921 notices in 1960, by 1970 over one million notices were being issued 
each year.13 Unfortunately, such statistics are not available from 1970. However, they 
were included in the 1971 return to Parliament on motoring offences (Home Office, 1971), 
which showed that of the 1.9 million FPNs issued, 1.7 million were for parking and waiting 
offences, and 95,565 were for the inadequate lighting offence. Had the fixed penalty system
13  By the end of the decade, the OTSP system had been expanded by the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 to include the 
offences of disregarding prescribed routes and non-payment of excise licence. However, the number of notices issued for 
these extra offences was comparatively low, amounting to approximately 10% of all FPNs issued (Home Office, 1971).
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not been in place, it is highly doubtful that the courts could have dealt with this level of 
offending, and it is also debatable whether this many enforcement actions would have taken 
place.
From these humble beginnings, the system of OTSPs went on to expand significantly, so that 
by 1986 (the year in which moving traffic violations – which include speeding, failing to obey 
traffic lights, motorway offences and neglect of pedestrian rights – punishable by police-
issued FPNs were introduced), just under five million motoring FPNs were being issued each 
year. Throughout the period of these developments, a concern with police efficiency was the 
dominant motivator for making changes to the law. The old ways of doing things, through 
the courts with a defendant and police officer present, were felt to be cumbersome and a 
drain on resources (see Snow, 2015). Incremental changes to the system of on-the-spot fines 
and the process through which recalcitrant defendants were dealt with also followed, which 
further automatised the system of punishing wayward motorists.
Increasing automation of the punishment process
The removal of FPN offence cases from court did not come without problems. Although it 
created an administrative system to deal with bulk offending, that system required its own 
rules to police as well as creating its own productivity problems. The first such problem 
tackled by legislation (the Road Traffic Act 1974) was resolved by a measure that was aimed 
not at irresponsible drivers, but at owners of motor vehicles. Although the FPN was aimed 
at tackling problematic parking behaviour, a significant problem with this approach was 
that, although cars carried registration marks, these related to the vehicle owner, and often 
there was no evidence as to the identity of the driver. This resulted in significant numbers of 
unpaid FPNs, and failed prosecutions, since a vital element of the case – the driver’s identity 
– could not be proved. Between 1960 and 1974, 23 million FPNs had been issued, of which 
one third were not paid (Hansard: House of Commons, 1974).
The deeming of responsibility of car owners for such offences represented another step 
towards automation of punishment. This process was enacted by the Road Traffic Act 1974, 
which sought to reduce the burden of chasing unpaid penalties (because the driver could 
not be identified) by making the owner liable for FPNs regardless of who was driving, unless 
the owner could show that the car was being driven without consent. Thus, the onus of 
proving who was driving the vehicle switched from the prosecuting authorities to the vehicle 
owner. The owner had to prove that they had not (or at the least raise doubt that they had) 
consented to the vehicle being used.14
When this proved to be inadequate to reduce the regulatory burden on the police, another 
Transport Act (1982) was introduced, ensuring that FPNs issued by police officers would 
14  At present this issue is dealt with under section 172 of Road Traffic Act 1988, which places a duty on the vehicle keeper to 
tell the police who was driving at the time of the suspected offence. Failing to notify the police is an offence (and an exemption 
to the privilege against self-incrimination: see O’Halloran and Francis v. UK 15809/02, (2008)). This is rarely a problem for other 
European jurisdictions, since these states rely on owner rather than driver liability. The European Transport Safety Council 
recommended in 2011 (ETSC, 2011) that EU member states should all adopt owner/keeper liability; it is unlikely that this will 
happen in the UK for the foreseeable future, given the embeddedness of the current legislative regime, although it would 
certainly increase the ability of the police to use 100% automated sanctioning.
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no longer have to be followed up by court proceedings. Instead the unpaid penalty would 
increase by 50% and be registered as a court fine, as if magistrates had imposed the 
penalty directly. This automatisation of the penalty did not apply to FPNs issued by traffic 
wardens (nor penalty notices imposed by an LA). Instead, unpaid penalties issued by these 
authorities had to be prosecuted through the magistrates’ court. This makes a certain 
degree of sense, given the split between the road safety ethos of police enforcement and 
the traffic management philosophy of LA enforcement (although, as noted above, this split 
is sometimes hard to sustain in practice, particularly where parking enforcement – and LA 
moving traffic enforcement – involves dealing with vehicles which imperil road safety).
One can see a clear theme emerging from the development of road traffic regulation: the 
concern to make the system more efficient and automated, in order to reduce the burden 
on the police, and the courts – although not at this stage at least on LAs, who still had to 
use the prosecution route. Whether such reductions in regulatory burden actually occurred 
is open to doubt. Previous research the author conducted (Snow (2015)) suggests that with 
the introduction of fixed penalties (across a range of areas of law) there was an increased 
burden (in terms of number of cases and overall costs) on both the courts and police 
service. It is only with the decriminalisation process of parking and waiting offences (Road 
Traffic Act 1991 and Transport Act 2004) that actual large-scale reductions are seen in the 
work facing both the police and courts for problematic motoring. Far from the overall burden 
reducing, however, it was simply shifted from police authorities (and the courts) to LAs, who 
took on the responsibility for enforcing parking offences.
Therefore, from a historical perspective, if one wants to chart the likely future trajectory of 
automatisation of the enforcement process, one needs to be sensitive to complaints from 
the courts and police service of being overworked or overburdened by offence types, and 
claims about the deterrent efficacy of the automated process. Automatisation has, to date, 
followed a predictable pattern of police concern about being overrun by cases that would 
be better dealt with through streamlined procedures. Furthermore, one cannot ignore the 
possible increased compliance that comes with increasing automatisation, since cameras 
can provide a level of enforcement that human policing cannot. The promise of constant 
surveillance no doubt has an impact also on the overall deterrent levels of the law, in terms 
of the certainty of capture, and thus automation provides a double benefit for enforcement 
authorities: it provides an increased capability to catch those who break the law, and 
does so in a way that is cheaper (and easier) to administer. (Whether automation results in 
increased compliance is certainly debatable and beyond the present scope of this research).
Parking and decriminalisation
In 1991, under the Road Traffic Act of that year, there was a move away from using the 
criminal justice system to deal with parking offences. This Act introduced the concept of 
decriminalised parking enforcement (DPE) in London; it no longer used the criminal law (i.e. 
parking offences in London ceased to be criminal offences), and removed the magistrates’ 
court from the adjudication of unpaid parking OTSPs. The Act introduced the Penalty 
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Charge Notice (PCN) which could be issued for breach of parking requirements in Greater 
London. The Act also created an independent appellate structure, separate from the court 
service.15 The Traffic Management Act 2004 (TMA) extended this process of DPE to the rest 
of England and Wales. The 2004 Act did not mandate that all LAs operate a system of DPE; 
instead it was a matter for each LA to adopt the provisions of the Act. At the time of writing 
345 LAs have adopted such powers, with a further 26 still operating under the criminal law 
contained in the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.
There is still an important geographical split between London authorities and the rest of 
England and Wales. At present, authorities in England and Wales, outside of London, do not 
have the power, under Part 6 of the TMA, to issue PCNs for the (moving traffic) offence of 
failing to comply with a road sign. Schedule 7, Part 4, Para 9 of the TMA lists the traffic signs 
that could be subject to enforcement if Part 6 were adopted across England and Wales.
There are 29 signs that can potentially be enforced by LAs:
• Vehicular traffic must proceed in the direction indicated by the arrow
• Vehicular traffic must turn ahead in the direction indicated by the arrow
• Vehicular traffic must comply with the requirements in regulation 15
• No right turn for vehicular traffic
• No left turn for vehicular traffic
• No U-turns for vehicular traffic
• Priority must be given to vehicles from the opposite direction
• No entry for vehicular traffic (when the restriction or prohibition is one that may be 
indicated by another traffic sign subject to civil enforcement)
• All vehicles prohibited except non-mechanically propelled vehicles being pushed by 
pedestrians
• Entry to pedestrian zone restricted (alternative types)
• Entry to and waiting in pedestrian zone restricted (alternative types)
• Entry to and waiting in pedestrian zone restricted (variable message sign)
• Motor vehicles prohibited
• Motor vehicles except solo motor cycles prohibited
• Solo motor cycles prohibited




• Route for use by buses and pedal cycles only
• Route for use by tramcars only
• Route for use by pedal cycles only
• Route for use by pedal cycles and pedestrians only
15  Prior to 1999, authorities outside London could adopt the decriminalised process under the Road Traffic Act 1991, but 
appeals had to be made to the London Parking Appeals Service. This changed into a dual appellate system in 1999, with the 
creation of the National Parking Adjudication Service for offences outside London, and the London Parking Appeals Service for 
those within London (Road Traffic (Parking Adjudicators) (England and Wales) Regulations 1999/1918). The Traffic Management 
Act 2004 formalised the current system of traffic regulation by way of OTSP, by providing for ‘civil enforcement of traffic 
contraventions’ both inside and outside London. There is still a dual appellate structure; inside London the relevant appellate 
body is the Parking and Traffic Appeals Service (PATAS), and outside London the Traffic Penalty Tribunal (TPT).
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• Route comprising two ways, for use by pedal cycles only and by pedestrians only
• With-flow bus lane which pedal cycles and taxis may also use ahead
• With-flow bus lane which pedal cycles may also use
• With-flow cycle lane
• Contraflow bus lane
• Contraflow cycle lane
• Box junction markings
This extensive list of traffic regulations potentially enforceable by a PCN is certainly capable 
of being enforced through automated means, although what the streets would look like 
with a proliferation of cameras and enforcement warning signs is a significant issue. The 
likelihood of Part 6 of the Act being implemented across England and Wales is discussed 
later in this report.
Road traffic enforcement post-1991
The growth of motoring regulation by FPN can therefore be split into two distinct phases: 
prior to 1991, FPNs were issued jointly by police officers and traffic wardens for a range of 
offences, and post-1991 there was a split system. Figure 2.2 gives some indication of how 
the simple Road Traffic and Road Improvements Act 1960 had morphed, by 1991, into a 
complex and wide-ranging system of motoring regulation. From just 16,921 FPNs issued in 
1960 for two offences, the system had grown by 1991 to one which generated 5.65 million 
FPNs issued annually for 37 offences.
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FPNs issued Prosecutions for summary motoring
Source: Data extrapolated from “Offences Relating to Motor Vehicles” HMSO, years 1961-1992”
The post-1991 reforms, as discussed above, bifurcated enforcement of road traffic 
regulation into the more serious moving traffic violations enforced by the police, and the 
more minor parking violations enforced by LAs (although LAs also enforce moving traffic 
parking violations, such as driving through a bus lane). Figure 2.3 shows the number of 
FPNs and prosecutions in respect of problematic motoring up to 2011, the last date for 
which such comparisons can be made (from 2011 onwards, the Home Office switched 
from counting the number of summary motoring offences to the number of defendants 
proceeded against in respect of summary motoring). In the last year for which statistics 
are available on a like-for-like basis, 9,852,248 OTSPs had been issued for problematic 
motoring. These OTSP were issued in respect of 79 police-enforced moving traffic offences 
and 15 separate categories of LA traffic offences (or civil offence if the authority operates 
under the TMA.)
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Source: Data extrapolated from “Offences Relating to Motor Vehicles” HMSO, years 1961-2006; “Motoring and 
breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010; “Police powers and procedures England and 
Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2012; “Report of the Adjudicators”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal (Previously 
NPAS), years 1999-2010; “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 2010-
2012; “Parking enforcement statistics” London Councils, years 2006-2012.
Reflecting on the changes to punishment procedure and its linking with road traffic, it 
should come as little surprise that the law has developed in the way it has. Wells and 
Savigar (forthcoming) note how the concept of ‘acceleration’ (Rosa and Scheuerman, 
2013) explains the development of traffic enforcement. The changes in law identified above 
demonstrate a desire from those who develop policy to increase the speed of operation, 
and reduce the administrative burden, of the punishment system. In short, the law is 
accelerating towards an automated system of punishment, which has as its zenith the use 
of the automated enforcement device. According to Rosa and Scheuerman we “pursue 
novel, purportedly time-saving technological devices in order to tackle the imperatives of 
an increasingly hectic everyday life” (cited in Wells and Savigar, forthcoming). It should not 
come as a surprise that government looks to such technology also to solve its problems 
and manage hectic everyday offending/regulatory breaches. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice 
is, at present, also turning towards the idea of automation for the total court solution. It 
plans to continue with so-called ‘automatic online conviction and statutory standard penalty’ 
(MOJ, 2016) procedures, which allow defendants in railway fare evasion, tram fare evasion, 
and possession of unlicensed rod and line offences to plead guilty online. According to 
the Government’s response to its consultation (MOJ, 2017), road traffic offences have also 
been highlighted as potential future offences to be given the same treatment. This raises 
the possibility that O’Malley (2010) is correct in his predictions, and road traffic enforcement 
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will be fully automated (from transgression to conviction) and telemetric. It is possible that 
no human hand, or eye, will even be involved in the whole process of punishment. With the 
advance of the motorcar and its impact on the social fabric of our geography, health and 
culture, it is unsurprising that we reach out for technological devices to enable us to keep up 
with the increasing pressures that contemporary life brings.
The changes to the enforcement process all highlight the particularly thorny problem of 
regulating a class of people (drivers) who are not used to being seen as a problem for the 
legal system. There is growing evidence of a body of resistance to automating enforcement 
(O’Malley, 2011); however, the contemporary debate about automation (particularly as 
touching speed cameras (see Wells, 2012)) should be set in its historical context. Corbett 
(2003) traces how legal challenge frequently follows developments in road traffic regulation. 
Whether it be drink-driving or speeding, motorists seem quite keen on mounting legal 
challenges to changes in law and enforcement practices. The legitimacy of road traffic 
regulation (whether for safety or road traffic concerns), and its ability to maintain and foster 
public support, will certainly continue to be a key challenge in the future, as indeed it has 
been thus far.
It can be clearly seen, then, that there is a desire to increase the effectiveness of the law 
by taking measures to streamline and automate processes that act as blocks on effective 
enforcement. Of course the underlying effectiveness of the law, in terms of both compliance 
and motivation to comply, seems (given the sheer scale of transgression) to be rather in 
doubt. At the same time as the procedure for imposing punishment was being streamlined, 
a more-or-less, automated system for capturing transgression was being developed.
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3. Automated Enforcement 
– Current Practice
Police automated enforcement
3.1.1 Police camera enforcement and public opinion
The Road Traffic Act 1991 partially incorporated the recommendations of the 
1988 North Report (DoT, 1988) that “modern camera technology should play a 
greater role in the context of traffic law enforcement” (Hooke, Knox and Portas, 
1996: 3). Just two offences were identified as being capable of / suitable for 
camera enforcement: driving in excess of the speed limit, and running a red 
light. Only speeding offences were included at the outset, in section 20 of the 
Road Traffic Offenders Act 1991. The White Paper The Road User and the Law 
(DoT, 1988) did contain a proposal to include neglect of traffic lights within the 
automated scheme, but this idea was abandoned at the time. Neglect of traffic 
signals (driving through a red light) was added to the list of offences capable of 
camera enforcement in 1997, through the Road Traffic Offenders (Additional 
3.1
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Offences and Prescribed Devices) Order 1997/384. Since then a number of new offences 
have been added to the camera enforcement provision; these include:
• contravening or failing to comply with an order or regulations made under either of 
those Parts relating to the use of an area of road which is described as a bus lane 
or a route for use by buses only (Road Traffic (Additional Offences and Prescribed 
Devices) Order 2001/1814 (Bus Lanes));
• an offence under section 29(1) of the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 
(using or keeping an unlicensed vehicle on a public road) (Road Traffic Offenders 
(Additional Offences) Order 2014/260); and
• an offence under section 11(1) of the HGV Road User Levy Act 2013 (using or 
keeping heavy goods vehicle if levy not paid) Road Traffic Offenders (Additional 
Offences) Order 2014/260.
As will be discussed below, the use of automated camera enforcement has been primarily 
directed at speeding motorists. It is little surprise therefore that the main debate about the 
acceptability of camera enforcement has focused on this offence (Wells, 2012; Corbett, 2003).
Relatively early in the development, and rollout, of these automated means of enforcement, 
it was decided that public acceptance was one of three pillars against which the 
effectiveness of cameras would be judged. In a 1996 report for the Home Office, Hooke 
et al. investigated “whether there was any ‘public hostility’ to the new technology, as this 
could have represented a major cost. There was no evidence that this was a factor” (Hooke, 
Knox and Portas, 1996: 22). As Wells notes, “the inclusion of this latter aspect as a potential 
cost or benefit suggests that, even at this early stage, the acceptability of cameras was 
considered to be as important as their effectiveness in producing a policy that could be 
considered ‘successful’” (Wells, 2012: 45).
Furthermore, in the 2003 evaluation of the two-year cost recovery programme for speed and 
red light cameras, public opinion was still a factor in assessing the effectiveness of the pilot. 
The report found, like Hooke et al., that “the level of public support for the use of cameras 
has been consistently high with 80% of people questioned agreeing with the statement that 
‘cameras are meant to encourage drivers to keep to the limits not punish them’” (Gains et al., 
2004: iv). The four-year evaluation of the National Safety Camera Programme in 2005 also 
found similar high levels of support for speed and red-light cameras (Gains et al., 2005: 7):
“The level of public support for the use of cameras has been consistently high 
with 82% of people questioned agreeing with the statement that ‘the use of safety 
cameras should be supported as a method of reducing casualties’. From the public 
attitude surveys there was strong evidence that there was overall positive support for 
the use of cameras and this stemmed from the belief that the cameras were in place 
to save lives – 71% of people surveyed agreed that the primary use of cameras was 
to save lives.”
The RAC Foundation commissioned a wide-ranging review into the effectiveness of speed 
cameras in 2010. As part of this review it examined the state of public opinion on road safety 
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cameras. Although it found some regional variations in partnership areas, overwhelmingly 
the speed and traffic light cameras seem to have been received very positively, and continue 
to be seen this way (Allsop, 2010). The AA, in conjunction with Populus, conducts regular 
polls of drivers chosen from an online motoring public opinion panel. In its reports it has 
found consistent support for the use of speed cameras, ranging from 77–82% (AA 2015; 
AA 2016), although in its more recent February 2017 report it found that 75% of motorists 
preferred to see a greater reliance on traffic police and less reliance on cameras (AA, 2017).
However, this general sense of acceptance was not reflected in media coverage, which 
repeatedly sought to question the rationale for camera use, implying (indeed, often asserting) 
that it was a revenue-raising device unfairly penalising otherwise safe and responsible drivers. 
Both broadsheets (see, for example, Jamieson, 2017) and tabloids (see, for example, 
Greenwood, 2015) alike ran campaigns citing camera-generated income as evidence of 
a ‘war on motorists’, skipping somewhat lightly over the fact that the only people paying 
the penalties were those motorists who had, in fact, broken the law. This accusation was 
not helped by the Treasury’s agreement to a ‘netting off’ (or hypothecation) process under 
which the penalty income was fed back to safety camera partnerships to fund yet further 
enforcement activity. The hypothecation process viewed through one lens could be seen as 
a virtuous circle, increasing the police’s ability to enforce the law. However, viewed through 
another more cynical lens, the lack of penalty income (owing to insufficient numbers of 
motorists breaking the law) could result in no safety camera partnerships, and thus – so the 
argument went – camera partnerships had a vested interest in increasing penalty income 
(perhaps where safety was not an obvious concern). Whether this actually happened is 
debatable, and beyond the scope of this research; however, it is fair to say that an impression 
of the latter was created and promoted by certain sections of the news media.
It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that the Coalition Government of 2010–15 focused so 
much effort on “ending the war on the motorist”. During the Coalition’s period in office, a 
number of policy pronouncements had the stated aim of “ending the war on the motorist” – 
see Pickles (2011) and Mike Penning reported in McCarthy, (2010), who expressly referred 
to “ending the war on the motorist” by ending central funding for fixed speed cameras. 
Furthermore, Philip Hammond (the then Transport Secretary) stated that “we need to 
rebalance road safety enforcement away from a narrow focus on camera-enforced speed 
policing” (Hansard: House of Commons, 2011). In that regard, the Coalition Government’s 
Strategic Framework for Road Safety (2011) saw the educational option, as an alternative to 
an FPN, as the way forward. It is crucial to note that, despite what was implied in Parliament 
by the Transport Secretary, there was still an acknowledgement of a role for cameras for use 
by the then Highways Agency (now Highways England) “using technology, such as fixed, 
mobile and average speed cameras, to control speed on the network and ANPR to identify 
and tackle dangerous vehicles and drivers” (DfT, 2011: 44).
3.1.2 Police automated enforcement
Since 1991, as discussed above, police authorities have used cameras to enforce both 
speeding and traffic light offences, and it is fair to say that the camera has increased in 
importance as an enforcement tool, especially over the past six years.
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Figure 3.1: Total fixed penalty notices issued each year, and the proportion that 








































Year (ending 31st March)
Camera-detected Non-camera-detected Percentage camera-detected
Source: Data extrapolated from “Motoring and breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010; 
“Police powers and procedures England and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2016.
As can be seen from Figure 3.1 the camera has become the predominant means for police-
enforced road traffic. With the ending of the NSCP (next section 3.1.3) in 2007/8 we can 
see small continued reductions in the proportion to which enforcement cameras contributed 
to the overall number of FPNs until 2011. Following this, the camera soon becomes the 
primary means through which road traffic policing (the enforcement side) is carried out. 
Across all police forces in 2015, 74% of all FPNs issued were camera-detected, a significant 
growth since 2011, when 52% of all FPNs issued were camera-detected.
Perhaps the main driver for the increase in the importance of automation has been the 
real-terms reductions in police budgets. Although standard enforcement cameras16 may 
be expensive to purchase and maintain, they are a cost-effective means of enforcing road 
safety (Gains et al., 2005) and in a period of austerity the camera holds out the possibility of 
providing an effective road safety enforcement device at reduced cost to police forces, with 
their tight budgets. Indeed, the cost of installation and maintenance of the new generation of 
average speed cameras has drastically reduced in price, from £1.5 million per mile in 2000 
to £100,000 per mile in 2016 (Owen, Ursachi and Allsop, 2016). Furthermore, with the 
16  This refers to those producing film rather than digital evidence
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advent of digital recording and 3G connections (and later iterations of mobile communication 
technology), today’s speed cameras are cheaper than ever.
Over the period 2011–16, the time at which we see the increasing dominance of camera 
enforcement in road safety, police budgets were reducing (by 22%) in real terms (Johnston 
& Politowski, 2016). As will be discussed below, reducing police budgets have led to a 
reduction in the number of traffic police officers across a number of forces.
3.1.3 Speeding
The policing of speed has, as discussed in Chapter 1, had something of a chequered 
history. From 2001, following the then New Labour Government’s Tomorrow’s Roads: Safer 
for Everyone (DETR, 2000), the NSCP scheme was introduced. The programme allowed 
safety camera partnerships to retain the income generated by enforcement cameras to 
spend on road safety enforcement (hypothecation). Following introduction of the policy there 
was a flurry of enforcement activity which relied heavily on speed cameras, so much so 
that during the policy’s life cycle (hypothecation was discontinued in 2008) over 11.5 million 
speeding offences had been detected (Wells, 2012).
It is difficult to judge what has happened to the statistics on speeding since the NSCP as, 
at the same time as it was being discontinued, the National Speed Awareness Course 
(NSAC)17 was starting to take off. Thus, we do not know whether the recorded incidence 
of a reduction of speeding FPNs is as a result of switching the cameras off / ending 
hypothecation, or merely a diversion into speed awareness courses. Based on NSAC 
statistics over the last five years (see figure 3.2) it would suggest that diversion rather than 
reduction is occurring, but this may not be the case.
17  This report does not attempt to analyse the ‘effectiveness’ of the NSAC, or of awareness courses in general. NDORS has 
evaluated the scheme (Brainbox Research, 2011), and further evaluations of the various awareness courses now on offer are 
ongoing at the DFT.
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Figure 3.2 Comparison of the number of fixed penalty notices issued for speeding 


















































































Year (ending 31st March)





Source: Data extrapolated from “Offences Relating to Motor Vehicles” HMSO, years 1961-2006; “Motoring and 
breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010; “Police powers and procedures England and 
Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2016; and “Trends and Statistics” NDORS, (n.d.) https://ndors.org.uk/
trends-stats/
The above chart shows the number of FPNs issued for speeding and NSACs attended for 
the years 1986–2015. Between 2005 and 2009 there were no published statistics on the 
number of NSACs attended, as not all police authorities had adopted the NSAC during this 
period. In Figure 3.2, the area shaded yellow demonstrates the period of uncertainty about 
the number of speeding offences officially sanctioned, given that the NSAC data was not 
included within official returns. The grey line shows the combined number of FPNs issued and 
NSACs attended for the years 2005–15 (albeit with no data for NSACs between 2005–9).
There were eight police forces, by 2005, that had adopted the NSAC: Lancashire, 
Staffordshire, Humberside, Gloucestershire, Northamptonshire, Lincolnshire, Thames Valley, 
and Avon and Somerset (Hansard: House of Commons, 2005). The rest of the country was 
still operating under the fixed penalty system, and if we compare the change in FPNs issued 
across these eight NSAC forces between 2004 and 2005 with those the equivalent in the 
rest of the country, we see that the NSAC counties decreased in terms of the number of 
FPNs issued, with a reduction of 17%, whereas the rest of the country saw a small increase 
in FPNs of 1% (Home Office, 2011). This clearly suggests that, rather than decreasing 
enforcement, the NSAC merely diverts enforcement into the awareness course route.
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Speeding and camera enforcement
Speeding enforcement has become dominated by automated means. Figure 3.3 shows 
the relative proportions of automated and traditional police enforcement of speed limits. 
As can be seen, the proportion of camera enforcement has remained relatively static, with 
predictable reductions during the period 2007–11 with the ending of the NSCP funding ring-
fencing and the national take-up of the NSAC. It is certainly true to say that the camera has 
been the predominant method for enforcing speed limits: in 2015, 92% of all speeding FPNs 
were issued by camera.
Figure 3.3 Total fixed penalty notices issued for speeding, and the percentage that 







































Year (ending 31st March)
Camera-detected Non-camera-detected Percentage camera-detected
Source: Data extrapolated from “Motoring and breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010 
and “Police powers and procedures England and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011–2016
The increasing reliance on the automated camera to enforce road traffic laws, post-2011, is 
hardly surprising, since the number of dedicated road traffic police officers was reducing quite 
sharply during this period (a year-on-year average reduction of 6% between 2011 and 2014). 
Between 2010 and 2014 there was a reduction of 23% in the number of full-time equivalent 
(FTE) police officers exercising traffic functions (Hansard: House of Commons, 2016).
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Table 3.1: Number of full-time equivalent (FTE) road traffic police officers
FTE road traffic police officers
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
5,635 5,316 4,868 4,675 4,356 5,220*
Source: HC Deb, 27 June 2016, cW 40656 retrieved from http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-
questions-answers-statements/written-question/Commons/2016-06-15/40656/ 
* The sudden jump between 2014 and 2015 does not necessarily mean that the government sought to increase 
the number of FTE road traffic officers. The Home Office explained the situation thus: “reclassification of roles within 
a force can lead to fluctuations in the number of officers in a particular role. This is particularly apparent between 
2014 and 2015” (HC Deb, 27 June 2016, cW 40656)
Forces hit particularly hard by this reduction were Devon and Cornwall (who had no full-time 
traffic officers for the period March 2012 to March 2013) and Essex, which saw a reduction 
of 71% in the number of traffic officers. These two forces, for the period 1999–2010 (the 
time at which road traffic enforcement was at its highest in terms of FPNs issued) were the 
second and fourth highest issuers of FPNs. In the following five years (during the austerity 
period), Essex dropped to 5th place (from 2nd), whereas Devon and Cornwall dropped to 27th 
(from 4th).
Table 3.1 shows the effect, in proportion of camera-enforced FPNs, of the reduction of road 
traffic officers.
Table 3.2: Reduction in the number of FTE road traffic officers in Devon and 
Cornwall and Essex and the changing proportion of camera detected offences
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Devon and 
Cornwall
Total FPNs 64,429 56,509 23,678 21,415 15,827 17,315 17,526 
Camera 
detections 19,565 18,043 10,852 11,219 10,744 14,291 14,829 
% Camera-
enforced
30% 32% 46% 52% 68% 83% 85%
Essex
Total FPNs 73,322 83,978 53,962 49,367 39,770 34,180 43,179 
Camera 
detections 27,320 20,243 17,770 21,615 18,750 23,223 31,742 
% Camera-
enforced
37% 24% 33% 44% 47% 68% 74%
Source: Data extrapolated from “Police powers and procedures England and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 
2011-2016
In these two police authorities, there was a virtual withdrawal of non-automated means of 
enforcement (as measured in FPNs issued). In Devon and Cornwall only 2,697 non-camera-
detected offences were punished via FPN in 2015 as opposed to 12,826 in 2011, and this is 
in a situation in which speeding offences increased in number from 2011 to 2015. Likewise, 
in Essex the number of non-automated FPNs reduced markedly from 36,192 to 11,437 
between 2011 and 2015. At the local level, despite the desire to move away from camera 
enforcement, Table 3.2 clearly demonstrates an increasing reliance on cameras to enforce 
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motoring regulations. What the above statistics demonstrate is that camera-enforced 
policing remains the overwhelmingly favoured approach, and that although the number 
of penalties have reduced this is largely due to the rise of the speed awareness course 
alternative.
It should not come as a surprise that with increasing fiscal pressure, police forces search for 
ever more cost-effective ways to maintain a level of enforcement. Thus, as physical police 
manpower decreases, one would expect there to be an increasing reliance on automated 
means to fill that gap.
It should be noted that an important caveat needs to be given regarding the above statistics. 
There are no national statistics on the relative proportion of camera-enforced violations that 
result in an awareness course being attended. It is highly likely that speeding offences that 
lead to a speed awareness course are more commonly captured by camera rather than 
police officer, although there are no statistics available to address this point.
3.1.4 Red light enforcement
As with the speed camera, it is difficult to assess the impact that ending the NSCP (and 
funding hypothecation) had on the enforcement of red-light running. Once again the growth 
of awareness courses for red-light running complicates the picture. The ‘What’s Driving 
Us?’ (WDU) course is the national course provided under the National Driver Offender 
Retraining Scheme (NDORS) for the offence of neglect of traffic directions. As can be seen 
from Table 3.3, a sizeable proportion of red-light offences are diverted from the FPN into the 
awareness course.
Table 3.3: Fixed penalty notices (FPNs) and awareness courses for red-light running
Calendar year FPNs WDU (awareness course) WDU as % of all
2010 148,179 – –
2011 118,361 – –
2012 97,134 10,724 10%
2013 80,999 65,031 45%
2014 42,738 99,668 70%
2015 41,863 123,397 75%
Source: Data extrapolated from “Trends and Statistics” NDORS, (n.d.) and “Police powers and procedures England 
and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2016
Figure 3.4 charts the use of FPNs for red-light offences over the last 30 years. Again, a small 
drop in issuing occurs, which is then followed by a steady increase as the awareness course 
is rolled out nationally.
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Figure 3.4: Rate of fixed penalty notice issue and awareness courses attended 
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Source: Data extrapolated from “Offences Relating to Motor Vehicles” HMSO, years 1987-2006; “Motoring and 
breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010; “Police powers and procedures England and 
Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2016; and “Trends and Statistics” NDORS, (n.d.)
Much like the NSAC, the WDU has become the primary means of enforcement, supplanting 
the FPN. This is certainly in line with Government policy during the Coalition period, as 
the 2011 Strategic Framework For Road Safety spoke of “increasing the range and use of 
educational courses that can be offered in the place of fixed penalty notices” (DfT, 2011: 9). 
This has certainly occurred.
In contrast to the situation for speeding, when it comes to red-light offending, camera 
enforcement has not been the predominant method for enforcement, although once 
more austerity, and the reduction of road traffic officers, has resulted in an increase in the 
proportion of camera enforcement, as Figure 3.5 demonstrates.
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Camera-detected Non-camera-detected Percentage camera-detected
Source: Data extrapolated from “Motoring and breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010 
and “Police powers and procedures England and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2016
It is worth noting again, as with speed camera enforcement, that there is wide regional 
variation in the use of camera enforcement in respect of red-light offences. Indeed, even at 
police force level there is a wide variation in the extent to which automated enforcement is 
used to capture traffic light neglect, and the extent to which automation is used to enforce 
speeding. For example, West Yorkshire Police in 2015, which has a high proportion of 
speeding offences captured by enforcement camera (95% of all speeding FPNs, 31,883) 
detects only 19% of red-light offences by camera (217 FPNs). Similarly, Avon and Somerset 
captured 98% (43,903 FPNs) of all speeding instances in 2015 by automatic means, but 
only 31% of red-light transgressions in this way (255 FPNs).
As discussed above, the large-scale reduction of road traffic police in both Essex and 
Devon and Cornwall also had an impact on red-light enforcement (see Table 3.4), although 
in Essex the effect seems to be minimal (due in large part to the pre-existing bias in favour 
of automated red-light enforcement). Again, it is worth noting the reduction in the number 
of offences overall with red light enforcement between 2007 and 2015, the extent to which 
the reduction in FTE road traffic officers contributed to this fall is, at present, unknown but is 
likely to have had some effect.
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Table 3.4: Neglect-of-traffic-light offending in Devon and Cornwall and Essex police 
force areas




Light FPNs 7,411 7,100 2,273 1,934 1,509 1,147 760
Camera 
detections 2,788 2,607 1103 895 1105 930 602
% Camera-
enforced
38% 37% 49% 46% 73% 81% 79%
Essex
Total Red 
Light FPNs 6,456 5,344 3,751 5,862 2,698 1034 738
Camera 
detections 5,251 2,317 2,585 4,855 1,708 819 567
% Camera-
enforced
81% 43% 69% 82% 57% 79% 77%
Source: Data extrapolated from “Motoring and breath test statistics England and Wales”, MOJ, years 2006-2010; 
“Police powers and procedures England and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 2011 -2016
Predictably, the complete withdrawal of road traffic police officers from Devon and Cornwall 
from March 2012 for a year saw a jump in the proportion of camera enforcement for red-
light offences, from 46% to 73%, a level of reliance on automated means of enforcement 
that continues. With Essex police the situation fluctuates seemingly year by year, and it 
is difficult to draw conclusions from the data about the reduction in traffic police and the 
enforcement of red-light offences. It is possible that, unlike speeding enforcement, red-light 
offending is more likely to enforced by general police officers, as they do not need to rely 
on sophisticated calibrated machinery to conclusively prove the offence (unlike speeding). A 
general police officer on vehicle patrol can enforce red-light running with little requirement for 
technological assistance.
Local authority automated enforcement
The first use of automated methods of enforcement by LAs began in December 1995. 
Driving in a bus lane was the first offence to be dealt with in this way. Originally dealt 
with through a warning to the motorist, issuing a PCN soon became the main method 
of enforcement under the London Local Authorities Act 1996, and in 1997 the first 
enforcement device (the ANPR camera) was prescribed for this purpose under section 20 of 
the Road Traffic Offenders Act (RTOA) 1988.
3.2.1 Parking enforcement and public opinion
The enforcement of parking regulations (and moving traffic transgressions such as bus lane 
and box junction enforcement) by camera has less public acceptance. To a certain extent, 
it is difficult to make an in-depth analysis of public opinion on parking enforcement owing 
to the overwhelming similarity between public and private parking enforcement – that is 
to say, it is difficult to understand whether complaints about parking relate to experiences 
with LA enforcement or parking on private land. This has become more difficult still with the 
3.2
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growth of private parking enforcement after the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and in 
particular the use of ANPR camera enforcement on private land. Logic would suggest that 
the enforcement of traffic regulation by LAs has more support (because of the public benefit 
remit, generally lower penalty amounts and terrible press for some private providers) than 
private enforcement, but one cannot discount the actions of some private providers (the 
so-called ‘cowboy clampers’) over the years, and the impact that this must have had on the 
perception of all parking enforcement.
The limited evidence of public opinion on parking enforcement that is available (mostly 
from LA surveys) suggests there is a majority in favour of it, and in particular of camera 
enforcement. A 2004 survey for the then Association of London Government (now “London 
Councils”) found that 67% of Londoners thought parking enforcement should stay the 
same or get more robust (TSC, 2005). An opinion survey of 1,000 adults carried out by 
RNS International and commissioned by the CCTV User Group18 found that 76% supported 
the use of CCTV for bus lane and parking enforcement. The Coalition Government’s 
consultation on changes to LA parking enforcement (the restriction on CCTV use) found an 
almost equal split between those who thought LA enforcement was being operated fairly 
or reasonably and those who didn’t (there was a very small – one person! – majority who 
thought parking enforcement was fair) (DfT, 2014). Despite this split in opinion, in relation 
to CCTV enforcement in particular, the responses to the consultation were overwhelmingly 
against a government ban on the use of CCTV for enforcement by LAs (ibid., 7). Once again, 
then, ANPR and CCTV for public parking enforcement was a ‘war’ that had public support, 
but clearly not support from central government.
This is not to suggest that LA parking enforcement is always viewed in a positive light – 
certainly a vast amount of anecdotal evidence exists (in the form of newspaper reports, 
newspaper comment, and online blogs etc.) suggesting a real concern with how parking 
enforcement is operated by LAs. It is quite surprising that there exists only limited national 
survey data on public attitudes to parking enforcement, a situation which needs correcting.
The Coalition Government’s “ending of the war on the motorist” was, in many ways, a 
culmination of negative press reports about revenue raising, troubling practices within certain 
LAs (incentivisation schemes (BBC News, 2014)) and the increasing use of automated 
means to punish parking transgressions. It is possible that this led to a desire to retreat from 
automated enforcement in the policing sector owing to a spread of perceived illegitimacy 
from camera parking enforcement to all camera enforcement on the road (although, 
interestingly, the Coalition proved reluctant to penalise enforcement by ANPR on parking on 
private land). It is possible that this is evidence for what Jonsson, Greve & Fujiwara-Greve 
call a “contagion of legitimacy loss” (2009: 196). They claim that an institution’s legitimacy 
is linked by association with that of similar organisations, and not simply ones that are in 
some way related to the organisation that has acted with perceived illegitimacy. Thus, ANPR 
enforcement has perhaps been de-legitimised for both the police and LAs because of the 
perceived illegitimacy of parking enforcement on both public and private land.
18  CCTV User Group: a membership organisation for all involved with CCTV management and other control room systems 
(www.cctvusergroup.com).
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3.2.2 Bus lanes and moving traffic enforcement
During the early stages of bus lane cameras, enforcement was split between the 
Metropolitan Police and London LAs. In the first 18 months of camera enforcement 
(December 1998 to June 2000), 9,543 notices of intended prosecutions were issued by the 
police. In contrast, in the first year of London LA enforcement, 57,000 PCNs and warning 
letters were issued (this was for April 1999 to April 2000). By 2002, the enforcement of bus 
lane infringements in London had grown to 290,231 PCNs issued (London Councils, 2008). 
From this limited data set it would seem that automation in the hands of LAs can deal with 
far more transgressions than the police are able to handle; indeed, the total number of PCNs 
issued each year (both automated and non-automated) far outstrips the number of FPNs 
issued by all police forces in England and Wales.19
It is difficult to meaningfully analyse the statistics for bus lane and moving traffic enforcement 
in LA areas, since every year more LAs adopt relevant bus lane and moving traffic 
enforcement powers. This is especially so with LAs outside Greater London. Any year-on-
year changes in both types of enforcement are therefore likely to reflect the increase in the 
number of authorities adopting these powers, rather than changes in practice (such as a 
greater reliance on automation in any one authority). Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 below show 
the changes in bus lane and moving traffic PCN issuing in Greater London (Figure 3.6) and 
bus lane PCN issuing outside London (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.6: Total Penalty Charge Notices issued for bus lane and moving traffic 



















Year (ending 31st March)
Moving trafficBus lane
Source: Data extrapolated from “Parking enforcement statistics” London Councils, years 2006-2012.
19  For 2014–15 the comparable figures are: 10,721,789 PCNs issued, by comparison with 3,823,937 FPNs and awareness 
courses together (2,420,382 FPNs plus 1,403,555 awareness courses).
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Figure 3.7: Total bus lane Penalty Charge Notices issued outside Greater London 



















































Year (ending 31st March)
New bus lane councils Bus lane
Source: Data extrapolated from “Report of the Adjudicators”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal (Previously NPAS), years 2008-
2010; “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 2010-2016
Figure 3.8: Proportion of Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) issued, and those issued 
by automated means
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Year (ending 31st March)
Combined total PCNs Total automated
Source: Data extrapolated from “Report of the Adjudicators”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal (Previously NPAS), years 
2008-2010; “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 2010-2016, “Parking 
enforcement statistics” London Councils, years 2006-2016.
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As can be seen from Figure 3.6, bus lane enforcement appears to be relatively static 
across the period April 2007–March 2015, although there is a slight growth in moving traffic 
enforcement (a 1% increase) in the latest statistics (2014–15). Outside Greater London 
(Figure 3.7), there appears to be a fairly substantial increase in bus lane enforcement (the 
orange line) over the period 2013–14, above that which can be attributed to new authorities 
adopting bus lane powers (grey shaded area). Again, however, it must be noted that the 
adoption of bus lane enforcement can come at any time of the year, and so an increased 
PCN issuing rate may owe more to bedding in of bus lane enforcement than to any 
increased enforcement per se. What is not in doubt, as Figure 3.8 demonstrates, is that 
automated means of PCN enforcement are becoming proportionally more important, from 
9% of all PCNs in 2007–8 to 17% in 2014–15. However, this may not be the true figure, as 
the use of so-called ‘CCTV spy camera cars’ or mobile enforcement vehicles (MEVs) are 
not differentiated from ordinary PCNs in official statistics. It follows that in order to get a 
true picture of the extent of automated enforcement, the contribution of MEVs needs to be 
examined, which is what we now address.
3.2.3 Mobile vehicle enforcement
Examining the effect of MEVs, i.e. spy cars, on LA parking enforcement is difficult. Few 
councils separate keep separate records of PCNs issued by MEVs and PCNs issued by 
CEO, making it impossible to know the true figure of automation at an LA level. Certainly, 
with the changes brought on by the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contravention (England) 
General (Amendment No. 2) Regulations 2015, which curtailed the use of CCTV evidence 
for parking contraventions, the level of automated enforcement is likely to have come 
down in LA areas. Previously, LAs could issue PCNs by post using CCTV/ANPR evidence 
(provided the CCTV was an approved device). Under the 2007 Civil Enforcement of Parking 
Contravention (England) General Regulations (2007 Regulations), ANPR devices could be 
used to enforce both on-street and off-street parking where it was impractical to issue a 
PCN (regulation 10(1) b & c, 2007 Regulations).
There are few statistics on the number of MEV PCNs issued; very few authorities separate 
the PCN issue statistics to this level of detail, instead providing figures on the number of 
PCNs issued for specific regulations. A Big Brother Watch report in 2010 identified 31 
councils using an MEV (although only 24 LAs had been found to issue PCNs through the 
vehicle20). During that period, those 24 LAs issued a combined total of 187,993 PCNs 
through the MEV; the combined total of all PCNs issued during this period for those 24 
authorities was 2,803,857. Thus, the MEV accounted for just 7% of all PCNs, although it 
should be noted that there was significant variation in the percentage contribution of MEV 
PCNs amongst the LAs (see Table 3.5) – from a high of 48% in Havering to a low of 0.6% in 
Redbridge.21
20  Five identified authorities provided no data, and in a further two, trials of an MEV were just beginning.
21  Although Camden is listed as the (proportionately) lowest-issuing authority in the list, the statistics for MEV enforcement in 
Camden cover the period 1 February 2010 to 31 March 2010.
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Table 3.5: The number of Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) issued by MEV-using local 
authorities, 2009–10 22
Local authority MEV-issued PCNs Total PCNs22 % MEV-issued
Barking and Dagenham 14,851 65,282 22.7%
Basildon 1,843 10,059 18.3%
Bexley 8,733 54,138 16.1%
Bolton 1,631 28,244 5.8%
Bromley 2,105 70,652 3.0%
Camden(*) 1,363 318,477 0.4%
Croydon 3,924 110,894 3.5%
Enfield 9,648 91,184 10.6%
Haringey 7,746 161,587 4.8%
Havering 18,602 38,434 48.4%
Islington 1,648 178,889 0.9%
Lambeth 34,016 187,901 18.1%
Lewisham 3,378 51,183 6.6%
Manchester 4,294 127,149 3.4%
Medway 16,129 45,709 35.3%
Newham 19,394 184,696 10.5%
Redbridge 651 104,130 0.6%
Richmond Upon Thames 12,305 84,295 14.6%
Southwark 1,204 107,851 1.1%
Sutton 206 26,387 0.8%
Tower Hamlets 3,724 82,799 4.5%
Wandsworth 3,303 153,666 2.1%
Westminster 14,217 485,319 2.9%
Wirral 3,078 34,932 8.8%
Total 187,993 2,803,857 6.7%
Source: Data Extrapolated from Big Brother Watch, 2010 and “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, 
Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 2010 
Note: (*) Statistics are from February 2010.
It is worth bearing in mind the speculative nature of these statistics. MEVs were in their 
infancy, and a number of authorities were trialling the vehicle, and did not report the date of 
commencement of MEV operation, meaning that some of the statistics may only represent a 
portion of the whole year’s use.
Big Brother Watch carried out a second survey of LAs in 2014 (Big Brother Watch, 2014), 
which asked for the number of MEV-issued PCNs between the period March 2009 and 
March 2013. Again, we can plot the number of PCNs issued over this period to see what 
22 Total PCN statistics are gathered from the annual reports of PATAS and the Traffic Penalty Tribunal.
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proportion are issued by MEVs. The data is contained in Table 3.6 (Greater London) and 
Table 3.7 (England and Wales, excluding London).
Table 3.6: MEV-issued Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) (as a percentage of total), 
Greater London Authorities, March 2009 to March 2013
Local authority in London MEV-issued PCNs  Total PCNs % MEV-issued
Barking & Dagenham 68,093 221,969 31%
Bexley 22,058 206,321 11%
Brent 30,305 420,467 7%
Bromley 13,937 325,334 4%
Camden 26,645 1,075,244 2%
City of London 3,999 216,288 2%
Croydon 16,875 421,032 4%
Enfield 4,266 324,751 1%
Hackney 23,873 339,870 7%
Haringey 36,678 664,553 6%
Havering 109,298 162,211 67%
Hounslow 8,900 518,218 2%
Kingston 33,230 203,815 16%
Lambeth 44,659 621,232 7%
Lewisham 22,686 203,791 11%
Merton 25,167 187,847 13%
Newham 59,003 750,451 8%
Redbridge 48,443 415,288 12%
Richmond 38,634 280,963 14%
Southwark 26,253 374,233 7%
Sutton 32,589 116,196 28%
Tower Hamlets 2,157 396,077 1%
Wandsworth 28,759 638,357 5%
Westminster 51,229 1,867,163 3%
Total 777,736 10,951,671 7%
Source: Data extrapolated from Big Brother Watch, 2014 and “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, 
Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 2010-2013
As can be seen from Table 3.6 there was wide variation in the uptake of MEV PCN issuing 
across Greater London, with Havering having the highest proportion of PCNs issued by an 
MEV (67% of all PCNs issued) and Tower Hamlets providing the lowest with just 1%. Nine 
London LAs had no MEV during this period. The mean average for MEV PCN issuing was 7%.
The situation outside London is remarkably similar as Table 3.7 demonstrates. Again, the 
average rate of MEV PCN issuing was just 6% of the total of all PCNs.
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Table 3.7: MEV-issued Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) in England and Wales 
(excluding Greater London), March 2009 to March 2013
Local authority MEV-issued PCNs Total PCNs % MEV-issued
Barnsley 1,730 31,281 6%
Bedford 7,715 101,842 8%
Birmingham 8,518 529,098 2%
Bolton 14,652 108,712 13%
Bournemouth 13,716 108,440 13%
Bristol 10,599 298,278 4%
Bury 20,484 78,268 26%
Cheshire West 1,445 84,818 2%
Hartlepool 3,420 29,404 12%
Liverpool 2,354 281,921 1%
Luton 1,454 131,901 1%
Manchester 258 530,042 0%
Medway 58,548 184,369 32%
North Tyneside 3,531 58,452 6%
Nottingham 676 246,019 0%
Oldham 1,384 99,035 1%
Peterborough 7,026 64,991 11%
Plymouth 18,021 148,703 12%
Poole 2,426 75,321 3%
Reading 2,005 179,453 1%
South Tyneside 3,873 46,060 8%
Southend-on-Sea 15,254 156,231 10%
Stoke on Trent 16,274 86,932 19%
Torbay 2,410 137,202 2%
Wirral 7,513 116,794 6%
Wolverhampton 51 84,590 0%
Total 225,337 3,998,157 6%
Source: Data extrapolated from Big Brother Watch, 2014 and “Parking enforcement statistics” London Councils, 
years 20010-2014
As can be seen from Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, several authorities had very low issue rates for 
MEV PCNs during the 2009–10 period (Table 3.5). It may be that this period is the point at 
which the use of MEVs began to increase – again, statistics obtained by Big Brother Watch 
in 2014 can help us understand the development of MEV PCN issuing post-March 2010. In 
its report Traffic Spies, Big Brother Watch (2014) collected statistics on the number of PCNs 
issued by MEVs across all LAs in England and Wales for the period March 2009 to March 
2013. The MEV PCNs for 2009–10 can then be subtracted from the number of issued for 
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the period 2009–13 obtained from the original Drive-by Spies (Big Brother Watch, 2010) 
report, and the resulting figures, which relate to 2010–13, then compared with the number 
of PCNs issued by those authorities with relevant data for that period. The statistics are 
reported in Table 3.8, and show that the mean of all authorities has grown over the period 
2010–13, suggesting an increased reliance on automated enforcement at the expense of 
non-automated, albeit a relatively small increase (0.5%) (MEV mean enforced % 2010/13 
minus MEV mean enforced % 2009/10). The statistics also highlight that London Councils 
dominated the uptake of MEV enforcement.
















Barking and Dagenham 14,851 68,093 53,242 156,687 34.0%
Bexley 8,733 22,058 13,325 152,183 8.8%
Bolton 1,631 14,652 13,021 80,468 16.2%
Bromley 2,105 13,937 11,832 254,682 4.6%
Camden 1,363 26,645 25,282 756,767 3.3%
Croydon 3,924 16,875 12,951 421,032 3.1%
Enfield (*) 9,648 4,266 −5,382 324,751 -
Haringey 7,746 36,678 28,932 502,966 5.8%
Havering 18,602 109,298 90,696 123,777 73.3%
Lambeth 34,016 44,659 10,643 433,331 2.5%
Lewisham 3,378 22,686 19,308 152,608 12.7%
Manchester (*) 4,294 258 −4,036 402,893 -
Medway 16,129 58,548 42,419 138,660 30.6%
Newham 19,394 59,003 39,609 565,755 7.0%
Redbridge 651 48,443 47,792 311,158 15.4%
Richmond upon Thames 12,305 38,634 26,329 196,668 13.4%
Southwark 1,204 26,253 25,049 266,382 9.4%
Sutton 206 32,589 32,383 89,809 36.1%
Tower Hamlets (*) 3,724 2,157 −1,567 313,278 -
Wandsworth 3,303 28,759 25,456 484,691 5.3%
Westminster 14,217 51,229 37,012 1,381,844 2.7%
Wirral 3,078 7,513 4,435 81,862 5.2%
Total 184,502 733,233 548,731 7,592,252 7.2%
Source: Data extrapolated from Big Brother Watch, 2010 and 2014; “Parking enforcement statistics” London 
Councils, years 20010-2014 and “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 
2010-2013 
Note: * Data incongruence between 2010 and 2014 Big Brother Watch reports
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If the MEV was part of the ‘war on motorists’ that the Coalition Government claimed it was, 
then it played only a limited part in the war. The ‘war on motorists’ was, it seems, being 
fought overwhelmingly by conventional means, by CEOs issuing PCNs on the street or in 
public car parks.
With the above data we can begin to build a picture of the extent to which automated 
enforcement contributed to all parking enforcement across LAs by including both bus lane 
enforcement and moving traffic enforcement in Greater London. The data is reported in 
Table 3.9.
















Barking and Dagenham 53,242 44,336 76,156 173,734 277,179 63%
Bexley 13,325 0 – 13,325 152,183 9%
Bolton 13,021 0 – 13,021 80,468 16%
Bromley 11,832 16,962 – 28,794 271,644 11%
Camden 25,282 54,237 130,360 209,879 941,364 22%
Croydon 12,951 4,038 19,118 36,107 333,294 11%
Enfield (*) −5,382 5,814 17,097 17,529 256,478 7%
Haringey 28,932 14,561 48,136 91,629 565,723 16%
Havering 90,696 0 – 90,696 123,777 73%
Lambeth 10,643 67,053 89,196 166,892 589,580 28%
Lewisham 19,308 30,381 3,717 53,406 186,706 29%
Manchester (*) −4,036 117,269 – 113,233 402,893 28%
Medway 42,419 30,438 – 72,857 138,660 53%
Newham 39,609 16,753 47,927 104,289 630,435 17%
Redbridge 47,792 0 25,160 72,952 336,318 22%
Richmond upon Thames 26,329 15,498 – 41,827 212,166 20%
Southwark 25,049 2,659 32,443 60,151 301,484 20%
Sutton 32,383 0 – 32,383 89,809 36%
Tower Hamlets (*) −1,567 9,196 4,778 12,407 327,252 4%
Wandsworth 25,456 6,048 51,942 83,446 525,991 16%
Westminster 37,012 11 39,526 76,549 1,421,381 5%
Wirral 4,435 0  4,435 81,862 5%
Total 548,731 435,254 585,556 1,569,541 8,246,647 19%
Source: Data extrapolated from Big Brother Watch, 2010 and 2014; “Parking enforcement statistics” London 
Councils, years 20010-2014 and “Annual Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 
2010-2013 
Note: (*) Data incongruence between 2010 and 2014 Big Brother Watch reports
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We can see from Table 3.9 that there is a great deal of variation in the contribution that 
automated enforcement makes to parking enforcement, from 73% in the London Borough 
of Havering, down to just 4% in Tower Hamlets. Overall, however, we can see that, for these 
authorities, the average contribution of automated enforcement was approximately 19% of PCNs 
issued. It should be noted that this level of automation took place during a period of contraction 
in the number of PCNs being issued by these authorities, as Table 3.10 demonstrates. Thus, 
rather than increasing the number of PCNs being issued by LAs, automation instead merely led 
to a change in the way in which certain offences were enforced. It should also be noted that 
during this two-year period, while PCNs reduced by 4.2% in these authorities, the number of 
vehicles on the road increased by 1% (although this is a national figure) (DfT, 2017a). The number 
of PCNs issued across all authorities between 2010 and 2013 also increased by 1%.
Table 3.10: Total of all Penalty Charge Notices (PCNs) issued by local authorities 
who had use of MEVs from 2009
Local authority 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13
Barking and Dagenham 102,437 94,496 80,246 
Bexley 54,031 50,155 47,997 
Bolton 26,952 27,408 26,108 
Bromley 89,412 90,180 92,052 
Camden 350,490 330,763 260,111 
Croydon 114,530 110,321 108,443 
Enfield 85,421 86,703 84,354 
Haringey 177,164 189,546 199,013 
Havering 37,420 47,001 39,356 
Lambeth 201,743 196,274 191,563 
Lewisham 59,755 64,315 62,636 
Manchester 125,811 137,430 139,652 
Medway 54,089 47,352 37,219 
Newham 212,452 221,220 196,763 
Redbridge 111,805 111,297 113,216 
Richmond Upon Thames 74,831 64,532 72,803 
Southwark 100,615 98,747 102,122 
Sutton 23,266 31,705 34,838 
Tower Hamlets 99,973 110,277 117,002 
Wandsworth 171,468 183,558 170,965 
Westminster 471,737 492,881 456,763 
Wirral 29,090 27,740 25,032 
Total 2,774,492 2,813,901 2,658,254 
Percentage change, 2010/11–2012/13 −4.2%
Source: Data extrapolated from; “Parking enforcement statistics” London Councils, years 20010-2014 and “Annual 
Statistics Report, Traffic Penalty Tribunal”, Traffic Penalty Tribunal, years 2010-2014
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With the then Coalition Government’s determination to “end the war on the motorist”, 
the Civil Enforcement of Parking Contravention (England) General (Amendment No. 2) 
Regulations 2015 amended the circumstances in which CCTV evidence could be used for 
parking enforcement. At present, under the 2015 regulations, CCTV enforcement can only 
be used for on-street parking enforcement (regulation 9 of the amended regulations limits 
off-street enforcement to PCNs personally issued by a CEO) and only in the following limited 
circumstances:
• a vehicle is stationary in a bus lane;
• a vehicle is stationary in a bus stop clearway or bus stand clearway;
• a vehicle is stationary in a zigzag-lined no-waiting area outside a school entrance; 
or
• a vehicle is stationary on a red route.
The list of offences is a mixed collection of both safety (zigzag lines) and traffic regulation 
concerns (bus and red routes), although quite why it is legitimate to enforce zigzag lines 
outside a school entrance but not at the pedestrian crossing (potentially a short distance 
down the road) is not at all clear – with the present situation appearing confusing (and 
somewhat ridiculous). So, far from automation of enforcement being reserved for clear 
public safety concerns, LAs are still entitled to use automated enforcement to manage traffic 
flow (although only in well-defined areas), yet are prohibited from using it where clear public 
safety concerns might arise. This is a largely irrational state of affairs, and the Government 
should revisit the issue, particularly where public safety is concerned.
It is too early to tell what effect these changes (relating to MEVs and CCTV use) will have, since 
there are no published statistics for March 2015 to March 2016 (at the time of writing). It would 
be surprising if there has not been an effect on the statistics, especially where LAs may have 
made staffing decisions based on the availability of an MEV, but it is too early to tell.
Although the 2015 regulations removed the power to issue PCNs by post for all but the 
limited DPE offences listed above, it should be noted that they make no mention of using 
the enforcement vehicles (or indeed any ANPR enforcement equipment for that matter) to 
facilitate enforcement. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that some LAs may integrate, 
or plan to integrate, MEVs and ANPR-equipped static CCTV into enforcement monitoring/
planning. In its simplest guise, LAs may legally use the vehicle to send messages to mobile 
CEOs directing them where enforcement is needed. Whilst this may not be as efficient 
as actually using the fully digitally linked ANPR capabilities of MEVs (and static CCTV), 
it does have the potential to provide increased efficiency compared with the traditional 
CEO inspection model. Perhaps LAs should consider this approach for those regulations 
addressing road safety, rather than focusing on the (perhaps easier to prove) traffic 
management / parking regulations. This form of enforcement, ‘smart monitoring’, is certainly 
a likely future development should the 2015 regulations continue.
At present the use of automated enforcement by LAs is in a rather confusing state. There is 
a clear difference in rationale and underpinning ethos between regulations aimed at securing 
public safety on our roads on the one hand, and those securing the efficient flow of traffic 
on the other. Whilst the latter is a vitally important public concern, it is likely that heavy 
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enforcement aimed at traffic regulation will lead to concerns about legitimacy, particularly 
where there are limited or no safety concerns (e.g. in the case of off-street parking). At 
present, the policy on automated enforcement in LAs is not coherent, and creates a space 
for significant public concern and distrust. In particular, the blanket ban on the use of 
automated ANPR where there are clear public safety issues (e.g. zigzag lines leading to a 
level crossing or dangerously parked vehicles) seems irrational in a situation in which such 
egregious disrespect for public safety is not sanctioned with the same amount of regularity 
as, for instance, straying (even accidentally) into a bus lane.
Again, anecdotal evidence, from discussions the author has had with parking enforcement 
managers from across the country, suggests that lobbying is still ongoing regarding the 
2015 regulations, particularly in relation to zigzag markings approaching a pedestrian 
crossing and (potentially) allowing ANPR off-street parking enforcement (in a similar fashion 
to that provided by private parking operators, such as Parking Eye, Advanced Parking, Park 
Direct UK and many others). It is fair to say that, given the current political climate, this latter 
proposal is likely to meet stiff resistance both within government and amongst motorists.
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4. Automatic Enforcement 
– the Future
To begin mapping the future of automated enforcement we can examine 
the current legal framework of road traffic regulation to suggest potential 
candidate offences for future automation (i.e. using technological solutions). 
In what follows, the regulation of moving traffic is subject to analysis to find 
potential candidate offences from amongst both fully automated offences and 
those that are likely to involve a high degree of automated facilitation in the 
enforcement of the regulation. Moving traffic has been chosen as, at present, 
there is scope to increase the number of offences subject to automation. 
Again, the split between LA and police enforcement is important, as, in the 
current political climate, it seems there is greater scope for full automation 
in the policing context rather than in the LA context, as the discussion in the 
previous chapters has highlighted. Therefore, the future of automation in the LA 
sector is largely settled, for the immediate future at least, in moving away from 
full automation, although there appears to be scope for increasing the extent to 
which CEOs rely on technology to facilitate their enforcement.
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Legislative analysis
There are three main pieces of primary legislation that govern the policing of road traffic: 
the Road Traffic Act (RTA) 1988, the Road Traffic Offenders Act (RTOA) 1988 and the Road 
Traffic (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988.
The RTA 1988 (and its subsequent amendments) is a comprehensive piece of legislation 
that governs the regulation of moving road traffic, including vehicle construction and use, 
driving, licensing of drivers, road safety and the general powers of the police to enforce the 
above.
The RTOA 1988 deals with the consequences of offending by motorists, and sets out 
the procedures and rules that must be followed by the police in enforcing the RTA 1988, 
including enforcement by camera device.
The Road Traffic (Consequential Provisions) Act 1988 ensures that the above two acts are 
the primary acts for dealing with moving road traffic regulation and any previous enactments 
should be read as if they are contained within the above to acts.
Of the three, the RTOA 1988 is the primary piece of legislation for the analysis that follows 
– not only does it control the use of CCTV/ANPR devices in road traffic enforcement 
(section 20) but it also provides the scheme of FPNs operated by the police in Schedule 3. 
Immediate future developments in the use of automated enforcement are likely to come 
from this list of offences (Schedule 3 is replicated in Appendix C), since they do not require 
a court appearance, and hence adjudication, in the imposition of a penalty/punishment. 
At present, 70 moving traffic offences are on the FPN scheme and these have each been 
analysed to test their potential for automated enforcement in the future. At present 34 
offences are, or could possibly be, enforced through automated means. Nine of these 
offences are currently enforced through automated means, and they are coloured orange 
in Table 4.1. The remaining 25 are capable of being enforced with present technology, 
although the desirability of such enforcement, from both the government and public 
perspective, is questionable.
As can be seen from Table 4.1, there are two forms of automation that can be used to 
enforce the relevant regulations: ANPR camera, and some form of ignition interlock system. 
The Road Safety Act 2006 amended the RTA 1988 and introduced into the 1988 act the 
idea of an interlock enforcement mechanism for the offences involving driving under the 
influence of alcohol (Sections 3A(1) a, b & c, 4, 5(1), 7(6) and 7A(6) of the RTA 1988).
The Road Safety Act 2006 contained a proposal to introduce an automated interlock system 
to regulate, and control, recidivist drink-driving. The alcohol ignition interlock “has intrigued 
road safety professionals since the 1960s” (Beirness, Clayton and Vanlaar, 2008: 8), but it is 
only in relatively recent times, with the development of breathalysing hardware and its virtual 
100% capture record, that the system has been taken seriously (ibid.). The modern alcohol 
ignition interlock operates by taking samples of a driver’s breath, prior to starting the motor 
vehicle, and disabling the ignition system if the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) exceeds 
4.1
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a permitted amount.23 There seems no reason why ignition interlocks, cannot, as a matter 
of technological development, be used for a number of the offences listed in Table 4.1. 
Although deciding whether an offence should be dealt with by way of ignition interlocks 
requires consideration of wider issues than merely whether it is technically possible (e.g. 
fairness, reliability etc…)
As can be seen from Table 4.1, the offences that can be dealt with by way of ANPR-
automated enforcement are all strict liability offences, or ‘state of affairs’ cases, which 
means that simple facts can prove the case, without the need to determine something as 
uncertain as the mental intention of the driver. The offences are generally either “using”, 
“keeping” “leaving” or “breaching” some requirement that can be proved without inquiring 
into the accused’s state of mind. Thus, fully automated enforcement methods can be used, 
as little judgement is required on the part of the enforcement agency (in most cases the 
police) to assess whether the offence has been committed; the camera and linked software 
can effectively do the work of a police officer. The interlock offences noted in the list, on the 
other hand, generally relate to activities that drivers/owners are required to perform prior 
to engaging in driving or using the vehicle in some way. For instance, for the offence of not 
wearing a seat belt the system could require a positive action (engaging the seatbelt), by the 
driver before allowing the vehicle to start (see under the heading ‘Seat belts’ in section 4.1.1 
for more on this particular offence).
23  The future of alcohol ignition interlocks is discussed further under the heading ‘Drink-driving’ in section 4.1.1.
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4.1.1 Policing priorities 2015–20: the ‘fatal four’
The National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) five-year strategy (2015–2020) (NPCC, n.d.) 
for road safety sees automation and technology as central to enforcement practice in the 
future. Across all four of its strategic objectives (‘Safe’, ‘Secure’, ‘Effective’ and ‘Efficient’), 
technology is seen as a priority, either directly or by implication. The Safe objective requires 
“utilising appropriate technology to reduce the numbers of persons killed or seriously injured 
on UK roads” (NPCC, 2015: 3). The Secure objective demands the “use of automatic 
number plate recognition (ANPR) to detect and disrupt those criminals who use the 
road” (ibid.). The Effective objective asks for engagement with partnerships to “deliver 
a safer and more secure network road approach” (ibid.: 4, emphasis added). Finally, the 
Efficient objective, although not mentioning technology directly, talks of road policing 
being “innovative and flexible in our approach, using effective communications to help 
deliver cost-effective solutions to harm reduction” (ibid.). Furthermore, in its evidence to the 
Transport Select Committee (TSC) on Road Safety Law and its Enforcement, the NPCC saw 
future opportunities for technology and automation, stating that road policing would “make 
even better use of technology to achieve compliance with roads safety legislation” (NPCC, 
2015, section 5.4). Technology and automation is therefore likely to be central to police 
enforcement, which should come as no surprise given the current, and likely future, pressure 
on police budgets.
The main priority for police road traffic enforcement at present is to focus on the so-
called ‘fatal four’: drink- and drug-driving, speeding, not wearing a seat belt, and using a 
mobile phone whilst driving (TSC, 2016). These offences are, thus, the most likely targets 
(in addition to the general range of communication and education campaigns) for future 
automation in the short to medium term. In the following sections each offence is examined 
in turn to look at the potential for automated solutions in enforcement.
Drink-driving
Drink-driving is an offence that has, throughout its history, been automatised, in the sense 
described in the historical review section. Procedures for proving a drink-driving case have 
been streamlined to such an extent that the offence (since the Road Safety Act 1967 and 
the introduction of roadside a breathalyser test) is now largely proved, and the enforcement 
facilitated, through technology – although it is not a fully automated system, in that it requires 
a police officer to administer the test. Once a positive breath sample is given the process of 
enforcement begins, and generally leads inevitably to an automatic sentence of suspension 
of the accused’s driving licence.
As was the case with speeding enforcement through automated means, the introduction of 
the breathalyser was not universally welcomed by motorists, and led to a “raft of case law 
that tried to expose legal loopholes and challenged the reliability of the new breathalyser and 
the procedures themselves (Black, 1993)” (Corbett, 2003: 76). This is another example of 
the resistance by drivers to automation of enforcement that has been a factor throughout 
all road traffic automated systems. As discussed above, such systems eventually gain a 
majority of public support, though it is a long and difficult process. Drivers are, seemingly, 
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suspicious of developments in enforcement, and such suspicion typically revolves around 
the issue of trust, and in particular trusting the motives of the enforcing authority (as well as 
the science behind the enforcement intervention).
There is no doubt, however, that drink-driving continues to be a problem for the UK, as 
well as for the rest of Europe. Approximately a quarter of all road fatalities are due to drivers 
under the influence of alcohol (COWI et al., 2014). In Great Britain, according to the latest 
statistics, that figure is lower, at 13% (and has remained relatively static for the previous 
ten years, with a high of 18% in 2006 (DfT, 2017b)), although Great Britain still has the 
highest blood alcohol threshold in Europe. The European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) 
have been leading the calls for greater enforcement (and integration of technology) in the 
fight against drink-driving. They recommend that states should have a minimum level of 
enforcement such that one in five of the driving population should be checked each year. 
Furthermore, they also recommend that states should introduce alcohol interlock schemes 
for recidivist and professional drivers in the first instance, and for all drivers in the longer term 
(ETSC, 2012).
As discussed above, proposals to implement an ignition interlock system for recidivist 
drink-drivers were contained within the Road Safety Act 2006. Ultimately the idea was not 
carried forward owing to the fact that “the costs of implementing and enforcing a scheme 
are likely to be disproportionate” (Hansard, 2013). This followed a report, commissioned by 
the Department for Transport (DfT) to investigate the usefulness, acceptability and impact on 
lifestyle of these devices.
Alcohol ignition interlock devices work according to the following (Clayton & Beirness, 2008: 9):
“Every time an attempt is made to start the vehicle, the driver is required to blow 
into a small breath-testing instrument that is wired directly to the vehicle’s ignition 
system. If the device detects alcohol in excess of the threshold value, which can be 
set at different values, the vehicle will not start. The typical value in current use is 
0.02% (20 mg alcohol/100 ml blood).”
Alcohol ignition interlocks are used widely in a number of American states and Canada, and 
they are also used in several European states including; Sweden, Denmark, Finland, The 
Netherlands and Belgium (ETSC, 2012).
Clayton and Beirness (2008) conducted an international review of alcohol ignition interlocks 
and found that take-up of the device was low, with typically less than 10% of all eligible 
offenders choosing to participate in the scheme. Most systems allowed the offender 
to choose to participate in the programme (and charged an ongoing fee) in return for a 
reduction in the length of their driving ban (although there are harsher regimes). Clayton & 
Beirness found that uptake varied dependent upon the consequence of not installing such a 
device – for instance in Indiana (USA) the threat of jail as an alternative led to a 70% take-up. 
In more liberal Quebec, the promise of a reduced length of mandatory suspension likewise 
increased uptake, although at the significantly lesser level of 20%. The evidence for the 
alcohol ignition interlock UK pilot was mixed, at best. The pilot study found negligible impact 
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on drinking behaviour, which was a significant risk factor in recidivism, but the system was 
nevertheless well regarded by most participants. However, there was also a significant 
attrition rate for study participants, with 43% of them failing to complete the full 12 months, 
which suggests that there is support for the alcohol ignition interlock in principle but a clear 
dislike for the operation of the system in practice. (Beirness, Clayton and Vanlaar, 2008). 
Added to this, the financial costs, which can be significant for the motorist (where they are 
expected to bear the cost) in terms of fitting, maintenance, removal and the extra cost on 
their motor insurance (Clayton & Beirness 2008), led the Government to reject implementing 
the legislation on a wider scale.
It is unlikely therefore that the alcohol ignition interlock will be taken forward any time soon, 
especially given the success of the drink-driving rehabilitation scheme (Inwood et al., 2007) 
and anti-drink-driving campaigns (Angle et al., 2009; DfT, 2011). Nevertheless, the European 
Commission is continuing to monitor (and promote) interlock programmes. Furthermore, 
the ETSC continues to highlight the effectiveness of ignition interlocks providing they are 
combined with rehabilitation programmes (ETSC, 2016a). It is worth bearing in mind, as 
identified above, that if the system does gain police support and is seen as a means of 
reducing police bureaucracy and increasing efficiency, the interlock may yet be resurrected; 
the evidence from Europe, however, is mixed in this regard. The ignition interlock scheme in 
the Netherlands “had a severe impact on the workload of the National Vehicle Authority, the 
Central Office of Driving Certification and the department of the Public Prosecutor. However, 
it did not result in a higher workload for the police” (ETSC, 2016a: 14).
However, a possible development in drink-driving enforcement is for the BAC limit to be 
lowered to bring it in line with most other European states, rather than an increase in 
automated enforcement. The European Commission has long pushed for a harmonised 
0.5 BAC limit across Member States (Commission Recommendation (2001/C48/02)). More 
recently the Local Government Association (LGA) and Fire and Rescue authorities have begun 
lobbying for a similar reduction to 0.5 BAC (LGA, 2017); at present the level is 0.8. In the EU 
only Malta has a similar level (and they plan to reduce that limit to 0.5 shortly (Xuereb, 2017), 
while all other European nations have a reduced level of 0.5, 0.2 or in some cases zero (ETSC, 
2016b). Just how long the Government can withstand this pressure is an open question.
Speeding
Certainly, the enforcement of speeding will continue to be primarily, if not completely, 
automated. As the TSC notes, “If enforcement is going to be effective as the number of 
dedicated road policing officers continues to fall, the use of technology is essential. Speed 
cameras are an important and effective part of the technology toolkit.” (TSC, 2016: 13).
Average speed cameras have been existence on the road network since 2000 (starting in 
Nottingham) and they consist of tracking a vehicle over a distance to obtain the average 
speed of the vehicle. Owen, Ursachi and Allsop (2016) have examined the effectiveness 
of average speed cameras and do find some very positive results, suggesting a 36.4% 
reduction in fatalities and serious collisions, and a 16% reduction in all personal injury 
collisions. The authors also caution, however, that such effects may be due to a higher 
incidence of collisions in the period leading up to the study, rather than as a result of 
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installing the average speed camera (a potential “regression to the mean” effect) (2016: 23). 
The authors also found that when using analysis methods that are typically employed by 
the police and road safety partnerships, there was a reduction of 50% in serious and fatal 
collisions, and a 25% reduction in personal injury collisions (ibid.). It is thus likely that such 
agencies will continue to increase reliance on average speed cameras, given the evidence in 
favour of them.
The TSC report also sees an expanded role for average speed cameras, as they are seen to 
be more publicly acceptable than fixed cameras, and more effective as well (TSC, 2016: 12) 
(a point reinforced by Owen et al.’s study). In regard to public acceptability, Wells notes the 
average speed camera has a greater ability to focus the driver on his or her driving over a 
period, rather than concentrating on the single snapshot associated with the older Gatso-
style cameras. She states (Wells, 2012: 178):
“Gatso-type cameras ha[ve] often been criticised for capturing isolated moments 
at isolated locations, which itself is a major factor in some drivers feeling that their 
whole self has not been fairly represented or judged.”
The average speed camera has the potential to provide the contextual background to an 
incidence of speeding which should mitigate some of the perceived harshness of the single-
instance cameras – although how far this will actually alleviate driver complaints is open to 
doubt, as the history of motoring regulation demonstrates that resistance to technological 
developments is a common feature in the reaction to all innovation.
The Government, in its response to the TSC report, also agreed that “average speed 
cameras make a positive contribution to speed limit compliance” (Hansard: House of 
Commons, 2016: 2). Therefore it is likely that average speed cameras will continue to be 
used, and may even replace fixed cameras in the longer term.
The TSC also recommends increasing the transparency of funding, and ensuring that 
the placing of cameras is for legitimate purposes and not for revenue raising. These are 
certainly not new suggestions – indeed, they have been made repeatedly throughout the 
years in relation to any form of automated road traffic enforcement (see TSC 2004, 2006, 
2016). As points of principle they are perfectly correct and legitimate; in practice, though, 
it is doubtful whether much will change, and certainly not at the level of perceptions at 
which the TSC operates. Road safety partnerships currently publish such data, and at an 
individual camera level. Whilst a reiteration of the principle of openness is to be welcomed, 
its practical effectiveness in combating the idea that cameras are revenue raising devices is 
likely to be illusory.
Seat belts
As part of its CARS 2020 action plan, the European Commission has a priority of ensuring 
that all motor vehicles are fitted with seat belt reminders (warning lights that illuminate when 
a seat belt has not been engaged) (EC, 2012). Such reminders use technology to facilitate 
compliance with safety objectives (and legal requirements), although they do not affect the 
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operability of the vehicle (unlike an interlock system). Such warnings ‘nudge’ (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2009) drivers towards the regulatory standard (to wear a seat belt), rather than 
forcing them to do so.
Despite such nudges, many drivers (and passengers) still fail to wear their seat belt when 
driving (or being driven). The number of fixed penalties issued for this offence in 2015 was 
19,808, although this still represents a substantial downwards trend (an 89% reduction) in 
the five years between 2010 (151,838 seat belt FPNs) and 2015 (19,808 seat belt FPNs). 
Clearly there is still a hard core of drivers that the seat belt safety message has yet to reach. 
Similarly to the drink-driving situation, the technological enforcement solution proposed for 
seat belt use has been the seat belt ignition interlock, which works in a similar fashion to the 
alcohol ignition interlock, by preventing motor vehicle ignition unless a seat belt is worn by 
the driver.
Seat belt interlocking systems are not new, having been in existence in some form since 
1973, when the first US federal standard, no. 208, mandated that newly manufactured cars 
had to have a belt system that prevented a car starting unless the belt was engaged (i.e. 
extended more than 4 inches from the normal position) (Robertson, 1975). The system was 
not universally accepted and, after public resistance, the federal standard was withdrawn 
(Brovold et al., 2007).
The TSC has rejected the idea of introducing seat belt interlocks, on the basis that 
assurance/evidence has yet to be provided to satisfy the public that “it would not interfere 
with normal, legal use of the car, that the existing exemptions (to the law) [e.g. emergency 
service use etc] are replicated in the technology, and that unjust costs will not be passed to 
consumers” (TSC, 2016: 17). Once again, the cost of the system and its likely resistance 
are barriers against the likelihood of this form of automated facilitation being adopted any 
time soon. More likely, in this regard, is an increasing use of current ANPR DVD systems to 
provide evidence of driving without a seat belt (and travelling as a passenger unsecured), as 
mentioned above. Of course, this will have resourcing consequences for police forces, as 
it requires physical viewing of the DVD to assess whether the offence has been committed, 
although, following the 2011 guidance from The Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) on outsourcing (see below), this may not be too resource intensive, providing there 
are appropriate safeguards in place as regard section 75 of the RTOA 1988 (whereby a 
constable must have reason to believe that a fixed penalty offence has been committed).
Mobile phone use
As for illegal mobile phone use, again, automated enforcement seems a tenable solution 
for dealing with this offence. The TSC have recommended that research should be funded 
to investigate “the development and effective deployment of technology to detect illegal 
mobile phone use while driving” (TSC, 2016: 18). Quite how such a system would work with 
the pervasiveness of mobile technology and the increasing integration of Wi-Fi and mobile 
data into in-car systems is open to question. Certainly technology has been used to detect 
mobile phone use, as well as failure to wear a seat belt. Kent and Medway Safety Camera 
Partnership have used mobile camera vans to detect both offences, since they provide 
sufficient clarity through high-quality DVD recordings to witness them both (KMSCP, 2009). 
54 Automated Road Traffic Enforcement: Regulation, Governance and Use – A review 55www.racfoundation.org
However, this still requires a significant amount police officer input to review the evidence 
before deciding whether to issue the penalty, in contrast to dealing with speed and red-light 
running offences, which requires very limited input – typically nothing more than signing the 
letter containing the notice / speed awareness course offer.
Norfolk County Council has used an automated detection system for mobile phone 
use which operated in the same way as a speed indication device (Browne, 2015).24 Its 
effectiveness, however, was clearly seen to be open to question when the Road Safety 
Manager for Norfolk stated “[t]he system can’t detect whether it’s a passenger using a 
phone in a vehicle or whether a hands-free device is being used” (ibid.). Clearly there is a 
long development phase yet to be completed before enforcement takes place with this type 
of system.
4.1.2 A note on the Transport Act 1968 – tachograph enforcement
Although not one of the ‘fatal four’, road traffic regulation relating to HGVs is potentially an 
area of increasing concern, as the number of people killed or seriously injured by HGVs is 
rising (DfT, 2016). Breach of regulations regarding drivers’ hours could possibly be subject 
to interlock systems (as noted in Table 4.1) which prevent operation of the vehicle if the 
driver has failed to comply with drivers’ hours’ conditions under the Transport Act 1968 (and 
associated EU regulations). In this regard, there are proposals to increase the sophistication 
of tachograph technology and enforcement by using smart devices.
EU Regulation 165/2014 mandates the fitting of smart tachographs in all vehicles over 
3.5 tonnes that transport goods or people (nine or more including the driver) which are 
registered on or after 15 June 2019. The new generation of smart tachographs must 
be connected to a satellite navigation system that is capable of being read remotely by 
enforcement agencies. The regulation gives Member States a period of 15 years for 
enforcement agencies to be equipped with the remote reading equipment.
The Government has incorporated the legislation into UK law in Statutory Instrument 
248/2016 the Passenger and Goods Vehicles (Tachographs) (Amendment) Regulations. 
Breach of the regulations is an offence that, in the first instance, will attract an FPN under 
the RTOA 1988. EU Regulation 165/2014 mandates that enforcement is carried out at 
the “roadside” (Article 9(8)), rather than remotely, and thus fully automated enforcement, 
in the form of static sensors and automated checks, are not to be used. Therefore, there 
will be no remote issuing of penalty notices by post; enforcement should be carried out by 
an authorised officer at the roadside, at least for the foreseeable future. Certainly, there are 
justifications for this approach, given the wider road safety concerns in operating large good 
vehicles and the potential increased danger that such vehicles pose (by reason of their size). 
Whether this provision (article 9(8)) can withstand the pressure to fully automate the process 
that may inevitably arise, as the smart tachograph develops, is questionable. Certainly, 
the panoply of safety checks that the DVSA and the police can carry out at the roadside 
can counter this pressure, and the smart tachograph may be seen as an intelligence, 
rather than enforcement, tool. How the Brexit process will affect these regulations (and 
24  A speed indication device is a roadside notice that indicates to the driver their current speed and whether they are 
breaching the speed limit (typically by displaying a smiley or sad face emoji).
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prohibitions on fully automated enforcement) is unknown (The government’s Great Repeal 
Bill White Paper suggests that most, if not all, of EU law will be transferred directly into UK 
law). Nevertheless, as noted above, there may still be valid reasons for rejecting such fully 
automated enforcement.
However, with technological development and Brexit, there is no reason why this provision 
cannot (which is not to say it definitely should) be enforced through static checks and 
remote enforcement (much in the same way as with speed cameras). At present, EU 
Regulation 165/2014 prohibits this; whether it can continue to do so, particularly in a 
situation where the numbers killed or seriously injured by a HGV are rising (DfT, 2016), is 
debatable, and the issue may be revisited either at the European level, or at the national level 
following Brexit.
It is possible, therefore, that tachograph-based offences could become fully automated by 
linking ANPR CCTV with smart tachograph systems, to provide instant readings that can 
prove an offence without officer judgement. An alternative approach may be to mandate 
some form of interlocking system requiring data linking with the smart tachograph to prevent 
breaches of HGV and PSV (public service vehicle) driving regulations, using a preventative 
method rather than enforcement after the offence has been committed.
4.1.3 Outsourcing
The ability of automation to provide positive (and certain) evidence of a road traffic offence 
has, to a large extent, taken the policing out of the hands of road traffic police officers. 
There is no real need for policing expertise in interpreting the footage of transgression – it 
can, should the police force decide, be dealt with automatically with no input from a police 
officer, and merely require the physical act of placing an automated letter in the physical 
post.25 Furthermore, the partnership approach to traffic camera enforcement also does away 
with the need for police officers to be engaged in discussion of camera siting and policy, 
since that too can be a matter for specialised data analysis through either software or a 
data analyst. When this is combined with the austerity measures that have been forced on 
police forces, and the inevitable pressure on police budgets that result (HMIC, 2017), it is not 
surprising that some forces may consider outsourcing.
ACPO have produced guidance on outsourcing for police forces which finds few obstacles 
to outsourcing safety camera offence processing and operational functions (ACPO, 2011). 
Given developments in outsourcing in other areas of criminal justice policy (prisons and 
probation), the question has to be asked as to whether ANPR enforcement will remain a 
matter for the public police force, or can be transferred to private policing organisations. 
At present, the extent of outsourcing in safety camera enforcement is unknown, as it is 
a matter for each individual force and there are thus no national statistics. However, the 
police use of outsourcing has been on the increase (Ayling & Grabosky, 2006). The evidence 
25  Notwithstanding this, ACPO guidance requires a ‘dip sampling’ process to be in place, so that a portion of offences are 
witnessed by a police officer to satisfy section 75(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act (Conditional Offer of a Fixed Penalty 
Notice), which allows a Conditional Offer of Fixed Penalty where “a constable has reason to believe that a fixed penalty offence 
has been committed”. (ACPO, 2011). Moreover, it is possible that in future this step may not even be necessary if electronic 
service of documents were to become the norm. Such a system is straying very close to O’Malley’s vision of telemetric 
policing.
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of outsourcing in other areas of the criminal justice system (particularly the Prison and 
Probation Service) is not overwhelmingly positive (see HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2016a 
and 2016b), and police authorities should be wary of such an approach, particularly given 
the problems identified in other areas of the system.
4.1.4 Local authorities
Camera enforcement
At present, it is unlikely that automated enforcement will expand, in terms of the offences 
subject to automation, given the 2015 CCTV parking enforcement regulations. However, to 
a certain extent the process of outsourcing (discussed in the previous section) has already 
begun, with the decriminalisation of parking offences and of moving traffic offences (such 
as bus lane and box junction enforcement). Therefore, there may be opportunities for 
transferring further police-enforced offences to LA decriminalised enforcement.
The TSC’s 2015 report on Road Traffic Law Enforcement recommended that the 
Government should implement Part 6 of the TMA (discussed above) as regards moving 
traffic offences. Currently such offences are enforced by London LAs under separate 
legislation, with the PCNs issued for these offences representing 14% of all PCNs issued 
in London (London Tribunals, 2000–2016). Clearly there is scope here to increase, quite 
significantly, the number of automated PCNs, should Part 6 of the TMA be implemented 
for authorities outside London. Section 73(2)d of the Traffic Management Act would allow 
decriminalised enforcement for the offence of failing to comply with the indication given by 
a traffic sign. There are 29 types of signs that could be enforced under Schedule 7, Part 4, 
Para 9 of the Act (for a full list of signs please see section 2.5 of this report).
It should be noted that each of these offence types26 is essentially a state-of-affairs / strict 
liability offence, and as such is capable of being witnessed instantly without the need to 
take into consideration circumstances surrounding the offence. Thus, each of them is 
capable of being enforced through static CCTV, although this would require a proliferation of 
cameras and signs on the high street, which the Coalition Government was certainly keen 
to avoid (McLoughlin, 2013). Clearly if Part 6 of the TMA is to be fully implemented, then LA-
automated enforcement is likely to increase significantly.
LAs are overwhelmingly in support of implementing section 73(2) d (TSC, 2016: 31). At 
present, however, this is unlikely, and indeed the Government response to the TSC’s report, 
relying on fears of “revenue raising”, was to reject the proposal. It stated
“The Government remains to be convinced about the case for giving all authorities 
the powers to enforce moving traffic contraventions and the Government is not keen 
to see local authorities installing a raft of new cameras on yellow box junctions and 
elsewhere to issue PCNs for moving traffic contraventions.” (Hansard: House of 
Commons, 2016: 15)
26  Although there is only one offence, viz. failing to comply with the indication given by a traffic sign contrary to section 36 of 
the Road Traffic Act 1988, the offence can be committed in a myriad of ways, depending on the sign that has been ignored.
56 Automated Road Traffic Enforcement: Regulation, Governance and Use – A review 57www.racfoundation.org
At present, therefore, there is unlikely to be much movement on this front, although the LGA 
and PATROL (Parking and Traffic Regulations Outside London) may continue to lobby for 
this section to be implemented.
4.1.5 A note on cross-border enforcement
A significant challenge to automated enforcement in the policing context is the need to 
prove driver, rather than owner, liability. For British-registered vehicles this is relatively 
uncomplicated owing to section 172 of the RTA 1988, which requires the keeper of the 
vehicle to specify who was driving – failure to do so is an offence. However, in relation 
to foreign-registered vehicles, the situation is more complex since such vehicles are not 
registered with the DVLA (or the DVA in the case of Northern Ireland), thus making it difficult 
to trace and punish recalcitrant drivers. There has been European co-operation on this 
point, allowing for automated means to obtain the information from the home state of the 
registered vehicle.
The Cross-Border Enforcement Directive creates a process of cross-border information 
exchange using automation to obtain the details of vehicle owners/drivers not registered 
in the state in which they have committed a road safety offence. The Directive facilitates 
information exchange in relation to eight offences:
• speeding
• failing to use a seat belt
• failing to stop at a red traffic light
• drink-driving
• drug-driving
• not wearing a crash helmet
• using a forbidden lane
• use of a mobile phone device whilst driving.
The majority of these are, at present, police-enforced offences, although using a forbidden 
lane could include driving in a bus lane, and could thus be enforced by an LA under 
administrative rather than criminal law.
This Directive has a complex procedural history, with an adverse ruling from the European 
Court of Justice (European Commission v European Council, C 43/12) against the 
European Council and Parliament in their implementation of rules on cross-border 
enforcement for “crime and disorder” purposes. The European Court of Justice noted 
that a Directive for “road safety” purposes was not technically a measure “in relation to 
the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences” under Article 87(2) of the 
TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) treaty. As a result, a new Directive 
(Directive 2015/413) was drafted and implemented under Article 91(1), relating specifically to 
road safety, although the previous Directive (2011/82/EU) continued to have effect until the 
2015 Directive was enacted. The Directive imposed a deadline for implementation of the end 
of 2015, although the UK was exempted (along with Ireland and Denmark) until the end of 
2017. The UK has subsequently introduced legislation (The Road Vehicles (Registration and 
Licensing) (Amendment) Regulations 2017/554) to give effect to the Directive.
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The European Commission has indicated that it may support extending the list of offences 
subject to cross-border enforcement to include: not keeping a sufficient distance from the 
vehicle in front, dangerous overtaking, and dangerous parking (EC, 2016). The Commission 
also discussed possible harmonisation of standards (including type-approval procedures 
and calibration of devices) for automated cameras across the EU, but rejected the idea as 
a “non-justified interference in Member States’” enforcement policy choices (EC, 2016: 7) 
and added that this would continue to be the case unless there was evidence of a significant 
impact on road safety or cross-border enforcement (ibid.).
EUCARIS/CBE (the system for performing the cross-border checks: EUropean CAR and 
driving licence Information System / Cross-Border Exchange) has been subject to a number 
of problems, the main one being a lack of implementation of the Directive and poor use of 
equipment (Frisani, Zamboni and Monteiro, 2016). In particular, five Member States that had 
implemented the Directive failed to perform any outgoing searches on foreign-registered 
vehicles. Furthermore, the European Commission found that “it appears that less than half of 
the total number of offences committed by non-resident offenders are followed by a search 
with the application” (ibid.: 201).
Whilst this ‘back office’ process is not technically automated enforcement per se, it does 
create a streamlined enforcement procedure and, at present, the Government seems 
quite keen on the potential capabilities of the system for providing a level playing field 
of enforcement (Hansard: House of Commons, 2017). However, there are a number of 
significant challenges to implementing the Directive fully into UK law. Of course Brexit is 
perhaps the most pressing challenge to all EU-related co-operation in the field of road safety 
enforcement, and whether access will still be permitted post-Brexit will no doubt rely on the 
outcome of the Brexit negotiations. Furthermore, as highlighted above, the legal position of 
requiring driver details from the owner of the vehicle, under section 172 of the RTA 1988, is 
not replicated in a number of European jurisdictions. Thus the receiving state for a request 
may only be able to give the details of the vehicle owner but not the driver at the time of 
the offence, since they have no powers of compulsion. The Parliamentary Under Secretary 
of State for Transport until 15 June 2017, Andrew Jones MP, has stated that negotiations 
are ongoing in this regard with the European Commission, although it is unlikely to come to 
fruition, given the protection against self-incrimination in other European jurisdictions.
58 Automated Road Traffic Enforcement: Regulation, Governance and Use – A review 59www.racfoundation.org
5. Conclusions
Automation in the enforcement of road traffic regulations has a long history. 
Enforcement has, to a large extent, been routinised, and has led to near-
automatic imposition of punishment once a transgression has been witnessed. 
Just how much further, in terms of automation, this process can go is difficult 
to assess. It is possible that a fully “telemetric” and “simulated justice” 
(O’Malley, 2009) approach could be the next logical step. Motorists may, in 
the future, make payments on account, or in advance, that could be deducted 
the instant a road traffic transgression is witnessed. The withdrawal of the 
paper licence makes this process easier, as no longer will a driver have to 
surrender their licence to have it endorsed – it can be done automatically. The 
technology is no doubt already there; however, as a society we are probably 
not yet ready to accept this approach (indeed there are valid moral and political 
arguments against it), and we are thus left with incremental development of 
automated enforcement. The likely future direction, at least in the short term, is 
a heavier reliance on cameras and sophisticated sensors, either for carrying out 
enforcement or for facilitating it.
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At present, it seems, public policy is stuck between embracing the shiny new promise 
of technology and the intuitive perceptions of ministers (and citizens) that wide-ranging 
automated enforcement (without clear and obvious justifications for each offence) is 
untrustworthy, illegitimate and solely conducted to raise revenue. To counter these 
claims, authorities need to focus on, at the very least, the issue of whether enforcement is 
necessary in each particular instance, whether such enforcement needs to be automated, 
and – if it really does – how the process of punishment can be fair and appropriate, given 
the nature of the transgression. Figuring out what legitimate enforcement looks like in a 
system of increasing reliance on automation is an immediate requirement.
Dodge and Kitchin, in their very perceptive study of the automatic management of the road, 
note an important, although frequently overlooked, idea relating to road traffic enforcement 
(and controversy). They state (Dodge and Kitchin, 2007: 265):
“The long-held myth of the ‘freedom of the road’ has never fully been a reality, 
with driving being subject to various forms of state regulation that have sought 
to self-discipline drivers through threat of direct disciplining.”
The challenge, and the subject for debate, as the future unfolds, is to what extent we can 
retain a modicum of ‘freedom’ on the road, while balancing it against the need to regulate 
our behaviour – for the benefit of ourselves, of other road users, and of pedestrians.
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Appendix A: Police 
Service Strength – 
Full-Time Equivalent 
(FTE) Road Traffic 
Officers 2012–15
Table A.1: Police service strength – FTE road traffic officers by police force area, 
2012–15
2012 2013 2014 2015
Avon and Somerset 130 101 96 62
Bedfordshire 52 47 46 47
Cambridgeshire 86 85 76 72
Cheshire 109 106 89 119
Cleveland 102 100 92 88
Cumbria 84 87 82 87
Derbyshire 75 69 65 64
Devon and Cornwall 0 0 57 88
Dorset 52 50 47 54
Durham 93 90 83 69
Dyfed-Powys 78 81 77 80
Essex 229 217 76 148
Gloucestershire 60 53 48 45
Greater Manchester 282 284 248 226
Gwent 72 73 60 62
Hampshire 159 150 145 150
Hertfordshire 124 110 99 91
Humberside 110 103 96 83
Kent 124 112 101 94
Lancashire 155 145 142 113
Leicestershire 73 67 66 62
Lincolnshire 71 71 71 65
London, City of 31 24 25 24
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2012 2013 2014 2015
Merseyside 161 148 136 127
Metropolitan Police 331 306 264 1,433
Norfolk 100 96 95 91
Northamptonshire 61 59 59 38
Northumbria 170 144 151 144
North Wales 69 67 70 68
North Yorkshire 99 85 96 92
Nottinghamshire 36 16 15 13
South Wales 131 125 130 122
South Yorkshire 118 107 111 93
Staffordshire 52 58 49 47
Suffolk 56 92 88 89
Surrey 94 99 96 94
Sussex 150 144 139 143
Thames Valley 207 209 203 204
Warwickshire 25 39 37 35
West Mercia 83 83 80 70
West Midlands 276 286 282 264
West Yorkshire 236 238 225 22
Wiltshire 66 50 44 40
England and Wales 4,868 4,675 4,356 5,220
Source: Data extrapolated from Police Workforce, England and Wales March 2013 to 2016 retrieved from https://
www.gov.uk/government/collections/police-workforce-england-and-wales




Fixed Penalty Notices 
by Police Force Area
Table B.1: Percentage of camera-enforced fixed penalty notice (FPNs) by police 
force area, 2010–15
Police Force Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Avon and Somerset
Total FPNs 43,374 42,326 36,494 47,766 49,148
Total camera-
detected 20,014 24,405 25,367 40,294 44,158
% camera-
detected
46% 58% 70% 84% 90%
Bedfordshire
Total FPNs 13,448 15,396 15,154 15,923 14,647
Total camera-
detected 8,348 10,471 12,178 13,775 12,900
% camera-
detected
62% 68% 80% 87% 88%
Cambridgeshire
Total FPNs 24,705 29,515 19,320 21,545 19,218
Total camera-
detected 9,977 12,020 5,519 12,935 12,697
% camera-
detected
40% 41% 29% 60% 66%
Cheshire
Total FPNs 33,678 30,116 23,757 21,055 21,324
Total camera-
detected 14,395 13,538 10,427 13,318 13,812
% camera-
detected
43% 45% 44% 63% 65%
City of London
Total FPNs 6,273 6,337 4,342 2,923 1,967
Total camera-
detected 4,102 4,735 2,952 1,453 738
% camera-
detected
65% 75% 68% 50% 38%
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Police Force Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cleveland
Total FPNs 11,552 9,728 8,198 4,461 4,038
Total camera-
detected 4,855 4,442 2,965 1,837 2,623
% camera-
detected
42% 46% 36% 41% 65%
Cumbria
Total FPNs 19,286 19,225 15,405 13,792 13,633
Total camera-
detected 12,852 13,947 11,364 11,376 12,177
% camera-
detected
67% 73% 74% 82% 89%
Derbyshire
Total FPNs 10,834 9,815 9,863 14,119 10,533
Total camera-
detected 5,132 6,386 8,379 12,623 8,971
% camera-
detected
47% 65% 85% 89% 85%
Devon and 
Cornwall
Total FPNs 23,678 21,415 15,827 17,315 17,526
Total camera-
detected 10,852 11,219 10,744 14,291 14,829
% camera-
detected
46% 52% 68% 83% 85%
Dorset
Total FPNs 34,969 27,478 26,244 21,270 22,289
Total camera-
detected 21,331 18,462 19,816 16,372 18,123
% camera-
detected
61% 67% 76% 77% 81%
Durham
Total FPNs 8,951 5,449 4,904 2,786 2,970
Total camera-
detected 3,547 2,118 1,818 1,726 1,762
% camera-
detected
40% 39% 37% 62% 59%
Dyfed-Powys
Total FPNs 14,233 12,411 10,892 5,081 4,293
Total camera-
detected 0 0 0 0 0
% camera-
detected
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Essex
Total FPNs 53,963 49,367 39,770 34,180 43,179
Total camera-
detected 17,770 21,615 18,750 23,223 31,742
% camera-
detected
33% 44% 47% 68% 74%
Gloucestershire
Total FPNs 9,761 8,797 7,515 8,555 7,912
Total camera-
detected 4,714 5,213 5,142 7,101 6,151
% camera-
detected
48% 59% 68% 83% 78%
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Police Force Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Greater Manchester
Total FPNs 61,601 73,584 38,424 31,119 38,726
Total camera-
detected 36,964 36,251 21,635 23,211 33,122
% camera- 
detected
60% 49% 56% 75% 86%
Gwent
Total FPNs 16,052 15,809 8,931 7,802 5,770
Total camera-
detected 0 0 0 0 0
% camera- 
detected
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Hampshire
Total FPNs 43,197 44,994 34,439 33,989 36,989
Total camera-
detected 23,559 27,200 20,649 20,028 23,330
% camera- 
detected
55% 60% 60% 59% 63%
Hertfordshire
Total FPNs 33,763 29,004 19,491 20,556 27,750
Total camera-
detected 16,812 14,970 11,161 13,990 23,088
% camera- 
detected
50% 52% 57% 68% 83%
Humberside
Total FPNs 29,791 24,590 23,239 20,642 20,847
Total camera-
detected 14,691 13,897 17,047 15,805 16,516
% camera- 
detected
49% 57% 73% 77% 79%
Kent
Total FPNs 34,200 28,757 27,683 21,494 19,663
Total camera-
detected 14,282 16,283 21,868 18,160 16,137
% camera- 
detected
42% 57% 79% 84% 82%
Lancashire
Total FPNs 45,312 33,230 23,662 24,385 25,957
Total camera-
detected 15,778 14,239 15,661 20,329 22,029
% camera- 
detected
35% 43% 66% 83% 85%
Leicestershire
Total FPNs 27,881 19,459 17,636 16,617 13,760
Total camera-
detected 17,920 12,070 12,602 13,558 11,506
% camera- 
detected
64% 62% 71% 82% 84%
Lincolnshire
Total FPNs 32,964 29,897 20,163 20,032 17,541
Total camera-
detected 14,933 16,875 16,018 15,489 15,220
% camera- 
detected
45% 56% 79% 77% 87%
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Police Force Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Merseyside
Total FPNs 56,846 51,665 31,178 26,192 23,334
Total camera-
detected 11,871 13,531 12,653 11,352 13,689
% camera- 
detected
21% 26% 41% 43% 59%
Metropolitan Police
Total FPNs 136,363 126,171 149,389 113,267 86,398
Total camera-
detected 26,691 27,458 27,186 28,111 32,541
% camera- 
detected
20% 22% 18% 25% 38%
Norfolk
Total FPNs 28,868 21,007 21,340 21,922 26,662
Total camera-
detected 10,535 10,011 12,712 14,338 19,243
% camera- 
detected
36% 48% 60% 65% 72%
North Wales
Total FPNs 16,316 20,064 20,188 18,546 17,108
Total camera-
detected 8,470 9,050 10,008 13,438 14,051
% camera- 
detected
52% 45% 50% 72% 82%
North Yorkshire
Total FPNs 20,490 17,763 20,936 19,740 26,958
Total camera-
detected 4,741 5,810 13,218 13,975 23,017
% camera- 
detected
23% 33% 63% 71% 85%
Northamptonshire
Total FPNs 15,504 12,197 11,459 14,948 20,283
Total camera-
detected 8,588 7,414 7,816 12,374 17,551
% camera- 
detected
55% 61% 68% 83% 87%
Northumbria
Total FPNs 30,572 34,205 37,129 25,222 22,177
Total camera-
detected 21,679 26,695 31,638 22,003 19,927
% camera- 
detected
71% 78% 85% 87% 90%
Nottinghamshire
Total FPNs 36,653 32,204 28,629 31,621 31,082
Total camera-
detected 28,091 21,260 23,855 26,875 27,912
% camera- 
detected
77% 66% 83% 85% 90%
South Wales
Total FPNs 18,330 10,270 5,406 5,131 3,460
Total camera-
detected 0 0 0 0 0
% camera- 
detected
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
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Police Force Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
South Yorkshire
Total FPNs 33,181 22,018 25,622 18,196 21,099
Total camera-
detected 13,580 10,491 16,764 12,456 15,642
% camera- 
detected
41% 48% 65% 68% 74%
Staffordshire
Total FPNs 15,601 16,462 23,687 18,310 15,521
Total camera-
detected 11,216 12,697 21,011 16,534 13,386
% camera- 
detected
72% 77% 89% 90% 86%
Suffolk
Total FPNs 36,639 29,951 28,260 25,953 10,816
Total camera-
detected 17,088 12,877 13,041 11,031 3,166
% camera- 
detected
47% 43% 46% 43% 29%
Surrey
Total FPNs 34,350 31,025 26,262 24,346 34,411
Total camera-
detected 18,688 19,123 18,296 16,735 26,848
% camera- 
detected
54% 62% 70% 69% 78%
Sussex
Total FPNs 51,860 43,711 24,513 23,301 26,105
Total camera-
detected 23,178 19,219 15,494 16,145 18,586
% camera- 
detected
45% 44% 63% 69% 71%
Thames Valley
Total FPNs 63,614 54,987 69,546 63,115 64,124
Total camera-
detected 39,644 32,485 48,589 44,176 46,824
% camera- 
detected
62% 59% 70% 70% 73%
Warwickshire
Total FPNs 16,636 17,652 15,921 12,555 16,247
Total camera-
detected 13,057 14,104 14,152 10,988 14,507
% camera- 
detected
78% 80% 89% 88% 89%
West Mercia
Total FPNs 34,839 32,414 32,861 37,179 32,600
Total camera-
detected 25,253 28,410 28,198 33,177 28,452
% camera- 
detected
72% 88% 86% 89% 87%
West Midlands
Total FPNs 52,046 44,717 35,095 17,210 15,220
Total camera-
detected 20,608 18,969 19,114 12,133 9,918
% camera- 
detected
40% 42% 54% 70% 65%
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Police Force Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
West Yorkshire
Total FPNs 61,890 59,863 42,624 32,422 43,968
Total camera-
detected 26,047 27,973 17,862 20,210 32,100
% camera- 
detected
42% 47% 42% 62% 73%
Wiltshire
Total FPNs 14,173 10,541 11,981 5,505 3,692
Total camera-
detected 0 0 0 0 0
% camera- 
detected




Total FPNs 31,547 33,468 31,151 40,264 35,882
Total camera-
detected 31,547 33,468 31,151 40,264 35,882
% camera- 
detected
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Data extrapolated from “Police powers and procedures England and Wales statistics”, Home Office, years 
2011 -2016
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Appendix C: 
Schedule 3 of the 
Road Traffic Offenders 
Act 1988
Legislation Description of Offence
Offences under the Parks Regulation (Amendment) Act 1926
Section 2(1)
Breach of parks regulations but only where the offence is committed 
in relation to regulation 4(27) (driving or riding a trade vehicle), 4(28) 
(exceeding speed limit) or 4(30) (unauthorised waiting by a vehicle 
or leaving a vehicle unattended) of the Royal and other Parks and 
Gardens Regulations 1977
Offences under the Highways Act 1835 and the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984
Section 72 of the Highways Act 1835
Driving on the footway.
Cycling on the footway.
Section 129(5) of the Roads (Scotland) 
Act 1984
Driving on the footway.
Offences under the Transport Act 1968 (c.73)
Section 96(11) of the Transport Act 
1968
Contravention of any requirement of domestic drivers’ hours code.
Section 96(11A) of that Act.
Contravention of any requirement of applicable Community rules as 
to periods of driving, etc.
Section 97(1) of that Act.
Using vehicle in contravention of requirements relating to installation, 
use or repair of recording equipment in accordance with Community 
Recording Equipment Regulation
Section 98(4) of that Act.
Contravention of regulations made under section 98 or any 
requirement as to books, records or documents of applicable 
Community rules.
Section 99(4) of that Act.
Failing to comply with requirements relating to inspection of records 
or obstructing an officer, but only insofar as the offence relates to: —
(i) failing to comply with any requirement under section 99(1)(a); or
(ii) obstructing an officer in exercise of powers under section 99(2)(a) 
or section 99(3).
Section 99ZD (1) of that Act.
Failing to comply with requirements relating to inspection of recording 
equipment or records (whether electronic or hard copy) made by 
or stored on recording equipment except where that offence is 
committed by: —
(i) failing to sign a hard copy of downloaded data when required to do 
so under section 99ZC (1); or
(ii) obstructing an officer in exercise of powers under section 99ZF.
Section 99C of that Act.
Failure to comply with prohibition or direction in relation to driving 
vehicle.
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Legislation Description of Offence
Offence under the Road Traffic (Foreign Vehicles) Act 1972 (c.27)
Section 3(1) of the Road Traffic (Foreign 
Vehicles) Act 1972.
Driving, etc., foreign goods vehicle or foreign public service vehicle in 
contravention of prohibition etc.
Offence under the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974 (c. xxiv)
Section 15 of the Greater London 
Council (General Powers) Act 1974.
Parking vehicles on footways, verges, etc.
Offence under the Highways Act 1980 (c. 66)
Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980.
Obstructing a highway, but only where the offence is committed in 
respect of a vehicle.
Offence under the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14)
Section 12(5) of the Public Passenger 
Vehicles Act 1981.
Using public service vehicle on road except under PSV operators’ 
licence.
Offences under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (RTRA) (c. 27)
RTRA section 5(1)
Using a vehicle in contravention of a traffic regulation order outside 
Greater London.
RTRA section 8(1) Breach of traffic regulation order in Greater London.
RTRA section 11 Breach of experimental traffic order.
RTRA section 13 Breach of experimental traffic scheme regulations in Greater London.
RTRA section 16(1)
Using a vehicle in contravention of temporary prohibition or restriction 
of traffic in case of execution of works, etc.
RTRA section 17(4) Wrongful use of special road.
RTRA section 18(3)
Using a vehicle in contravention of provision for one-way traffic on 
trunk road.
RTRA section 20(5)
Driving a vehicle in contravention of order prohibiting or restricting 
driving vehicles on certain classes of roads.
RTRA section 25(5)
Breach of pedestrian crossing regulations, except an offence in 
respect of a moving motor vehicle other than a contravention of 
regulations 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Zebra, Pelican and Puffin 
Pedestrian Crossings Regulations and General Directions 1997.
RTRA section 29(3) Using a vehicle in contravention of a street playground order.
RTRA section 35A (1)
Breach of an order regulating the use, etc., of a parking place 
provided by a local authority, but only where the offence is committed 
in relation to a parking place provided on a road.
RTRA section 47(1)
Breach of a provision of a parking place designation order and other 
offences committed in relation to a parking place designated by such 
an order, except any offence of failing to pay an excess charge within 
the meaning of section 46.
RTRA section 53(5)
Using vehicle in contravention of any provision of a parking place 
designation order having effect by virtue of section 53(1)(a) (inclusion 
of certain traffic regulation provisions).
RTRA section 53(6)
Breach of a provision of a parking place designation order having 
effect by virtue of section 53(1)(b) (use of any part of a road for 
parking without charge).
RTRA section 88(7)
Driving a motor vehicle in contravention of an order imposing a 
minimum speed limit under section 88(1)(b).
RTRA section 89(1) Speeding offences under RTRA and other Acts.
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Legislation Description of Offence
Offences under the Road Transport (International Passenger Services) Regulations 1984 (Statutory 
Instrument 1984/748)
Regulation 19(1) of the Road Transport 
(International Passenger Services) 
Regulations 1984
Using vehicle for Community regulated carriage of passengers by 
road otherwise than in accordance with authorisation or certificate, 
etc.
Regulation 19(2) of those Regulations
Using vehicle for ASOR (Agreement on the International Carriage 
of Passengers by Road by means of Occasional Coach and Bus 
Services) regulated or Community regulated carriage of passengers 
by road without having correctly completed passenger waybill or 
without carrying top copy of waybill on vehicle throughout journey
Offences under the Road Traffic Act 1988 (RTA) (c. 52)
RTA section 3
Driving mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place 
without due care and attention, or without reasonable consideration.
RTA section 14 Breach of regulations requiring wearing of seat belts.
RTA section 15(2) Breach of restriction on carrying children in the front of vehicles.
RTA section 15(4) Breach of restriction on carrying children in the rear of vehicles.
RTA section 16
Breach of regulations relating to protective headgear for motor cycle 
drivers and passengers.
RTA section 18(3)
Breach of regulations relating to head-worn appliances (eye 
protectors) for use on motor cycles.
RTA section 19 Parking a heavy commercial vehicle on verge or footway.
RTA section 22 Leaving vehicle in dangerous position.
RTA section 23 Unlawful carrying of passengers on motor cycles.
RTA section 24 Carrying more than one person on a pedal cycle.
RTA section 34 Driving mechanically propelled vehicle elsewhere than on a road.
RTA section 35 Failure to comply with traffic directions.
RTA section 36 Failure to comply with traffic signs.
RTA section 40A Using vehicle in dangerous condition etc.
RTA section 41A Breach of requirement as to brakes, steering-gear or tyres.
RTA section 41B Breach of requirement as to weight: goods and passenger vehicles.
RTA section 41D Breach of requirement as to control of vehicle, mobile telephone etc.
RTA section 42 Breach of other construction and use requirements.
RTA section 47 Using, etc, vehicle without required test certificate being in force.
RTA section 71(1)
Driving, etc., vehicle in contravention of prohibition on driving it 
as being unfit for service or overloaded, or failing to comply with 
direction to remove a vehicle found overloaded.
RTA section 87(1) Driving vehicle otherwise than in accordance with requisite licence.
RTA section 143
Using motor vehicle while uninsured or unsecured against third party 
risks.
RTA section 163 Failure to stop vehicle on being so required.
RTA section 172
Failure of person keeping vehicle and others to give the police 
information as to identity of driver, etc., in the case of certain 
offences.
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Legislation Description of Offence
Offence under Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 (RTOA)
RTOA Section 90D (6)
Driving, etc., vehicle in contravention of prohibition on driving, or 
failing to comply with direction to remove vehicle on failure to make a 
financial penalty deposit payment.] 25
Offences under the Goods Vehicles (Community Authorisations) Regulations 1992 (Statutory 
Instrument 1992/3077)
Regulation 3 of the Goods Vehicles 
(Community Authorisations) 
Regulations 1992
Using goods vehicle without Community authorisation
Regulation 7 of those Regulations.
Using vehicle under Community authorisation in contravention of 
conditions governing authorisation.
Offences under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994 (c.22)
Section 34 of that Act
Using trade licence for unauthorised purposes or in unauthorised 
circumstances, etc.
Section 42 of that Act. Driving or keeping a vehicle without required registration mark.
Section 43 of that Act Driving or keeping a vehicle with registration mark obscured etc.
Section 43C of that Act Using an incorrectly registered vehicle.
Section 59 of that Act
Failure to fix prescribed registration mark to a vehicle in accordance 
with regulations made under section 23(4)(a) of that Act.
Offences under the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995 (c. 23)
Section 2(5) of the Goods Vehicles 
(Licensing of Operators) Act 1995
Using goods vehicle on road for carriage of goods except under 
operator’s licence.
Offences under the Public Service Vehicles (Community Licences) Regulations 1999 (Statutory 
Instrument 1999/1322)
Regulation 3 of the Public Service 
Vehicles (Community Licences) 
Regulations 1999
Using public service vehicle on road without Community licence.
Regulation 7 of those Regulations
Using public service vehicle under Community licence in 
contravention of conditions governing use of licence.
Offences under the Road Transport (Passenger Vehicles Cabotage) Regulations 1999 (Statutory 
Instrument 1999/3413)
Regulation 3 of the Road Transport 
(Passenger Vehicles Cabotage) 
Regulations 1999
Using vehicle on road for UK cabotage operations without 
Community licence.
Regulation 4 of those Regulations
Using vehicle on road for UK cabotage operations without control 
document.
Regulation 7(1) of those Regulations
Driver failing to produce Community licence on request when vehicle 
required to have licence on board.
Regulation 7(3) of those Regulations
Driver failing to produce control document on request when vehicle 
required to have control document on board.
Offence under the Vehicle Drivers (Certificates of Professional Competence) Regulations 
2007(Statutory Instrument 2007/605)
Regulation 11(7) of the Vehicle 
Drivers (Certificates of Professional 
Competence) Regulations 2007
Driver of relevant vehicle failing to produce on request evidence or 
document required to be carried under regulation 11(1), (3) or (5).
Offence under the HGV Road User Levy Act 2013
Section 11 of the HGV Road User Levy 
Act 2013
Using or keeping heavy goods vehicle if HGV road user levy not paid.
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